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Prisoners and Habeas Privileges
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Lee Kovarsky*
The U.S. Reports contain no answer to a million-dollar question: are
state prisoners constitutionally entitled to a federal habeas forum? The
Supreme Court has consistently ducked the basic constitutional issue, and
academic work on the question idles on familiar themes.
The strongest existing argument that state prisoners are
constitutionally entitled to a federal habeas forum involves a theory of
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. I
provide a new and different account: specifically, that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (“PI Clause”) guarantees a
habeas privilege as a feature of national citizenship, and that the
corresponding habeas power reaches state custody.
We now know that the common-law habeas writ did not evolve
primarily as a security for individual liberty, but in service of judicial power.
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court blessed this revised writ history.
This Article is the second entry in a series exploring the legal implications of
*
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those revisions. In the first article, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power,
99 VA. L. REV. 743 (2013), I argued that Article III judicial power secured for
federal prisoners the habeas privilege identified in the Suspension Clause. The
question that I reserved there—and that I answer here—was whether anything
about Reconstruction changed the operation of the habeas guarantee
embedded in the original Articles of Constitution.
The answer, in short, is yes. The Fourteenth Amendment PI Clause—
not the Due Process Clause—expanded the constitutionally protected scope of
the federal habeas privilege. The PI Clause yokes the habeas privilege to
national citizenship, the rights of which neither the federal government nor
states may abridge. And if, as I have argued, a federally protected habeas
privilege requires a corresponding federal habeas power, then the PI Clause
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum.
The first-order question I answer here—whether the Constitution
guarantees a state-prisoner privilege—is logically antecedent to second- and
third-order questions about the privilege’s scope. Because the Constitution
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, the legal community ought
to hit reset on basic assumptions about Congressional power to restrict the
habeas remedy, particularly in postconviction cases .
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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Reports contain no answer to a million-dollar
question: Are state prisoners constitutionally entitled to a federal
habeas forum to contest their custody? Endless controversy swirls
around habeas review of state convictions, but the Supreme Court has
consistently ducked the basic constitutional issue. Federal judges
charge into controversies over constitutional rights of prisoners; why
do they hesitate to declare the constitutional status of the most
important federal remedy?
Academic work on the question idles on familiar themes: the
original operation of the habeas guarantee on the several states;1 the
absence, until 1867, of a general statutory remedy for state detention;2
or the salient features of the Supremacy Clause.3 The strongest

1.
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126–80
(1980) (arguing that the Suspension Clause was a restriction on congressional authority to
interfere with state habeas process).
2.
See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (giving federal courts the general
power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state custodians).
3.
See, e.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 860 (1998)
(explaining that certain limits on federal review of state custody are unconstitutional based on a
comprehensive theory of federal supremacy).
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existing argument that state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to
a federal habeas forum involves a theory of incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (“DP Clause”).4 In this
Article, I provide a different account—one based on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause (“PI Clause”).
Specifically, I argue that the PI Clause guarantees a habeas privilege
as a feature of national citizenship, and that the corresponding habeas
power reaches state custody.
A fresh account of how the habeas guarantee operates on state
custody is timely, in part, because of the availability of new data about
how the English privilege related to judicial authority. We now know
that the common-law habeas writ did not evolve primarily as a
security for individual liberty, but in service of judicial power.5 In
Boumediene v. Bush,6 the landmark Supreme Court case holding that
the Constitution guaranteed the habeas privilege to prisoners at the
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Supreme Court blessed
much of the revised writ history.7
This Article is the second entry in a series exploring the legal
implications of those revisions. In the first, A Constitutional Theory of
Habeas Power (“Habeas Power”), I argued that the Article III judicial
power secured, for federal prisoners, the habeas privilege identified in
the Suspension Clause.8 The question that I reserved in Habeas
Power—and that I answer here—was whether anything about
Reconstruction changed the operation of the habeas guarantee
4.
See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing
that “the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized [the] supremacy-ensuring role of the federal
courts such that Congress is obligated to make federal review of state criminal convictions
practically available through federal habeas corpus”).
5.
Professor Paul D. Halliday is most responsible for this work. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY,
HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010) (providing a comprehensive historical
perspective on the habeas writ); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 701 (2008)
(discussing how the “writ of habeas corpus . . . was initially fashioned by judges”).
6.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
7.
Professor Halliday examined King’s Bench files, rolls, and rulebooks every fourth year,
from 1502 to 1708. HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 319. The result was data on 2757 prisoners. Id.
Boumediene relied heavily on this survey. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740, 747, 752 (citing Halliday
& White, supra note 5).
8.
Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (2013).
Cf. ERIC FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 10 (2003)
(arguing that judges always enjoyed common-law habeas power to relieve unlawful custody);
Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 607–08 (2009)
(rejecting the view “that the Clause promises only that whatever habeas right is given by the
grace of the legislature may not be suspended temporarily except in cases of rebellion or
invasion”).
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embedded in the original Articles of Constitution (“original
Constitution”). Indeed, the PI Clause established that there were
privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which included a
federal habeas privilege to contest state custody.
My argument proceeds in three Parts. In Part II, I specify the
basic conditions defeating consensus that state prisoners are entitled
to a federal habeas forum: (1) that there was no generally available
federal habeas remedy for state prisoners until 1867, and (2) that
theories accounting for a pre-1867 federal privilege for state prisoners
invite serious objections involving text, intent, and precedent. In the
process, I develop the habeas typology that I use to explain the
normative positions I take in the remainder of the Article.
Part III shows that the PI Clause expanded the
constitutionally protected scope of the federal habeas privilege, though
not through the familiar mechanics of Fourteenth Amendment
“incorporation.” The PI Clause restricts state governments by the
familiar injunction that “[n]o State shall . . . abridge,” but it also
restricts the federal government by declaring privileges of national
citizenship. The PI Clause yokes the habeas privilege to American
citizenship, and that connection remains unsevered even as the
Slaughter-House Cases otherwise reduced the Clause to a
constitutional afterthought.9
In Part IV, I argue that, in combination with the habeas
privilege recognized in the original Constitution, the PI Clause
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum. The first-order
question I answer here—whether the Constitution guarantees some
sort of state-prisoner privilege—is logically antecedent to second- and
third-order questions about its scope. Because the Constitution does
entitle state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, then the legal
community ought to hit reset on basic assumptions about
congressional power to restrict the habeas remedy, particularly in the
postconviction setting. If I am right, then multiple postconviction
provisions supplied by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)10 require renewed constitutional scrutiny.11

9.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (limiting the PI Clause to a few structural rights of
national citizenship).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244–67 (2012)).
11. See infra Part IV.C (discussing postconviction application in greater detail). The
Supreme Court takes this dispute quite seriously, as evidenced by its equivocation. See, e.g.,
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996) (“But we assume, for purposes of decision here,
that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than
as it existed in 1789.”).
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II. THE BASIC PROBLEM
The federal habeas privilege entitles a prisoner to argue, in
federal court, that custody is unlawful. The privilege corresponds to
judicial power over the prisoner’s custodian. Every time Congress
enacts new restrictions on federal habeas review of state custody—
including restrictions on postconviction review—courts sniff at the
idea that a restriction might be unconstitutional, but they always
walk away. One reason they are unwilling to seriously entertain a
constitutional challenge is that there is no consensus around even the
basic proposition that the Constitution entitles state prisoners to any
habeas forum.
Part II presents the basic problem. The fact that the original
Constitution or the Bill of Rights (“Bill”) entitled state prisoners to a
federal habeas forum is tough to reconcile with Congress having
provided no statutory habeas remedy until 1867.12 Maybe the
Constitution was interpreted too restrictively before 1867, and maybe
that restrictive precedent should be discounted accordingly. But such
opening caveats would severely degrade the type of account I want to
provide here. Rooting the state-prisoner privilege in the PI Clause
requires no such caveats, because the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868.
Even after clearing roadblocks thrown up by almost eighty
years of American constitutional history, there are still significant
problems lurking in a Fourteenth Amendment account. The
proposition that an amendment directed primarily to state action
actually restricts federal power requires an argument that pirouettes
through various objections rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
text, intent, structure, and precedent.
A. The Habeas Privilege and Judicial Power
The first step in a constitutional account of the habeas
guarantee is to distinguish a prisoner’s privilege from both the judicial
power to which it corresponds and the suspension rules that permit its
restriction. The power to issue a habeas writ and to review custody
belongs to courts and judicial officers.13 The privilege is a prisoner’s
12. Congress provided a federal habeas review for a very limited category of state custody
in 1833 and in 1842. See infra note 60 (citing Act of August 29, 1842 and Act of March 2, 1833).
13. The English power to issue common-law habeas writs—the obvious forerunner to the
parallel American power—was exercised by “[a]nyone designated as a ‘judge’ or ‘justice.’ ”
BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION & POSTCONVICTION LITIGATION 14 (2013). For example, Barons of Exchequer and Justices in Common
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entitlement to ask that the habeas power be exercised.14 So if a federal
privilege exists, so too would a corresponding federal judicial power.
The privilege-power pairing is native to English common law, which
helps explain the rule against suspending the habeas privilege in the
original Constitution’s Suspension Clause.15
English common-law habeas writs—and there were several
types—ordered a jailor to produce a prisoner for some purpose: to
move the prisoner to another court, to secure testimony, and so on and
so forth. Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was a laterdeveloping habeas writ, ordered a prisoner to be produced so a judge
could decide whether a jailor was exercising “lawful custody.” The
concept of “lawful custody” is perpetually evolving, but the basic
habeas guarantee ensures that a judge may inspect custodial
authority and discharge the prisoner. A habeas writ was denominated
as an English privilege because an English subject enjoyed the
benefits of process issued at the behest of a royal court.16
America’s constitutional guarantee reflects the common-law
privilege, as well as the power of suspension exercised by English
monarchs. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 provides that “[t]he Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” This
Clause does not actually create a suspension power—let alone the
privilege. It simply restricts a suspension power that presumably
comes from Article I, Section 8.17 Section 8 enumerates legislative
powers and also vests Congress with auxiliary powers that are
“necessary and proper” to exercise them. The suspension power might
be auxiliary to any number of enumerated powers: the power to
provide for the common defense;18 the power to govern the land and

Pleas could issue the writ. Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J.
523, 525–26 n.7 (1923). Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), interpreted the Judiciary
Act of 1789 to empower both courts and judges to issue habeas writs. See id. at 94–100. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, the modern source of federal habeas power, vests authority in both courts and judges. Id.
at § 2241(a)–(b).
14. This understanding of the relationship between the privilege and the corresponding
judicial power is long established. See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789,
at 107 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
16. See Halliday & White, supra note 5, at 630 (noting that the writ of habeas corpus was
traditionally understood as “originating in the concept of the king’s mercy”).
17. This characterization makes more sense if one appreciates context. The Suspension
Clause appears alongside several limits on otherwise-appropriate legislative power: the
prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, the rule forbidding Congress from
restricting the slave trade until 1808, et cetera. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
18. Id. § 8, cl. 1.
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naval forces;19 or the power to “provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.”20 The most likely font of suspension power, however, is the
enumerated authority to constitute the federal judiciary.21 The
important point is that the Suspension Clause merely restricts the
suspension power. Everything else about habeas corpus, including the
habeas power and the privilege itself, is a more active inferential
exercise.22
B. A Typology of Habeas Privilege
The normative position I take in Parts III and IV—that the PI
Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum—is built on
top of a descriptive framework for classifying potential privilege
features. I develop the typology here, and I refer to it frequently
throughout the Article. The easiest way to classify the privilege’s scope
is in three dimensions: (a) the sovereign from which the habeas power
of judges springs, (b) the sovereign authority under which a prisoner is
detained, and (c) the sovereign furnishing the law under which
custody is potentially unlawful. For my purposes, there is actually no
need to visually represent outcomes in dimension (c) because the U.S.
Constitution secures some privilege to contest custody that might be
in violation of federal law. Figure 1 therefore depicts the potential
privilege features in two dimensions.

19. Id. at cl. 12–14.
20. Id. at cl. 15.
21. Id. at cl. 9.
22. But cf. Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 602–03 n.94
(2010) (noting that “[n]ot all legal commentators have agreed that . . . the Suspension
Clause . . . provides Congress with the power to suspend habeas” but concluding that such a
reading is superior to other accounts of the suspension power). I remain skeptical that the
Suspension Clause—which appears in a list of Article I, § 9 limits on powers established
elsewhere in the Constitution—contains text that expressly limits habeas power but also does
double duty as an implicit source of the power so limited. The Supreme Court, at times, has
recognized the shortcomings of the Suspension-Clause-as-suspension-power theory. See, e.g.,
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619–20 (1842) (“No express power is given to
congress . . . to suspend the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion. And yet it would be difficult to
say . . . that it ought not to be deemed, by necessary implication, within the scope of the
legislative power of congress.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the suspension power comes from somewhere other than Article I,
§ 9).
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Figure 1: Potential Forum-Custody Configurations
Federal Custody

State Custody

Federal
Privilege

(1) federal privilege to
contest federal custody

(2) federal privilege to contest
state custody

State
Privilege

(3) state privilege to contest
federal custody

(4) state privilege to contest
state custody

To state my thesis most simply, I argue that the PI Clause added Type
2 features to the habeas privilege that the Constitution guarantees.
As I argued in Habeas Power, the original Constitution
guaranteed only a Type 1 privilege: a federal forum for federal
prisoners.23 Although I do not want to rehash Habeas Power, two of its
conclusions are important here. First, the original Constitution
guaranteed habeas process; Congress was not free to withhold habeas
jurisdiction from federal courts.24 Second, the original Constitution’s
habeas guarantee did not “apply to the states.” In other words, at the
turn of the nineteenth century, the Federal Constitution did not
entitle state prisoners to habeas process in any court.25
In Habeas Power, I explained that the best interpretation of
constitutional text before the Fourteenth Amendment—in light of
history, structure, and established maxims of federal jurisdiction—is
as a guarantee of a federal habeas privilege to contest federal
custody.26 Before going further here, I want to reiterate the problems
with a school of habeas thought in which the original Constitution
guaranteed no federal privilege at all. Understanding defects in that
account of the privilege will in turn help readers understand the
Fourteenth Amendment’s effect. In terms of Figure 1, no-federal23. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–95; see also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1267 (1970) (concluding that the Framers contemplated a Type 1
privilege); Steiker, supra note 4, at 872 (collecting sources and concluding that “the general
thrust of these positions is that the Suspension Clause requires the federal judiciary to provide a
check against potential abuses of federal power”).
24. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 754 (arguing that “Congress cannot restrict the
prerogative of a federal judge to decide whether federal custody is ‘lawful’ ”).
25. See id. at 809 (laying the framework of the Habeas Power Theory). But cf. FREEDMAN,
supra note 8, at 10 (concluding that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was supposed to allow courts to
discharge unlawfully detained prisoners); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus,
1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 649 (same).
26. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–94 (refuting two theories “that are inconsistent
with the principle that Article III vests and the Suspension Clause protects the power of a
federal judge to review federal custody”).
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privilege arguments might sustain a Type 3 privilege—a state habeas
privilege to contest federal custody—or they might support an
undepicted outcome in which the Constitution guarantees neither a
state nor a federal privilege. Because my account treats the original
Constitution as guaranteeing a federal privilege to contest federal
custody, readers should understand why that assumption is
appropriate. Habeas Power, which is an article-length defense of that
assumption, includes extensive treatment of each alternative
discussed below.27
1. The No-Federal-Privilege Hypotheses
Dissenting in INS v. St. Cyr,28 Justice Scalia speculated that
the Constitution may not guarantee any privilege whatsoever. He
noted that the language of Article I, Section 9 only limits a suspension
power, and that it does not explicitly provide for the privilege to which
the suspension power applies.29 Justice Scalia was parroting an
argument made many years before by Professor Rex Collings.30 Justice
Scalia mused about this possibility before discussing in greater depth
the originalist alternative: that the scope of the habeas guarantee was
frozen in 1789.31 When given the opportunity to reprise the view that
the Suspension Clause referenced a privilege that need not exist,
Justice Scalia declined. In Boumediene v. Bush,32 not a single Justice
expressed doubt that the Constitution furnished a habeas guarantee
of some sort.33
27. See id. at 781–94 (addressing the “Null Power Hypothesis” and the “Inter-Sovereign
Habeas Hypothesis”).
28. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
29. See id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of this text discloses
that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but
merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”).
30. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or
Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 341–42 (1952). The position ultimately reflects Chief
Justice Marshall’s dictum in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), stating that, absent
a statute, “the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be
enacted.” Id. at 95.
31. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the Suspension Clause grants “some constitutional minimum of habeas relief”).
32. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
33. There were two Boumediene dissenting opinions, one by Justice Scalia and one by Chief
Justice Roberts. Id. at 801–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 826–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Four Justices joined each dissent. Justice Roberts argued that, even if the habeas privilege did
extend to such detention, Congress enacted a substitute remedial process that was
constitutionally “adequate and effective” to test custody. Id. at 808 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that there was no federal privilege available to “unlawful enemy
combatants” who were not U.S. citizens and who were not detained either in one of the fifty
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The Supreme Court mothballed the Scalia/Collings theory for
good reason: the interpretive work necessary to deny the existence of
any privilege whatsoever is substantial.34 The framers of the original
Constitution and the Bill did not write constitutional text purporting
to create rights.35 The framers of each document labored under
theories of natural law in which rights were “recognized” or “declared”
because they preexisted constitutions.36 The Constitution bars
suspension of the habeas privilege but lacks express language of
creation because the Framers believed such language was
unnecessary.37 Suspension was one of the defining English abuses of
the revolutionary struggle,38 and those abuses were on the minds of
those responsible for framing and ratifying the original Constitution.39
Some of the drafters fought about the language in the Suspension
Clause, but they did not disagree that the privilege existed. What they
clashed over was whether the habeas privilege required an express
textual guarantee and whether it could ever be suspended.40 The axis
of disagreement was the same at state ratifying conventions.41
states or in a federal territory. Id. at 826–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neither opinion entertained
the idea that the Federal Constitution did not secure a habeas privilege. Id. at 801–26 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 826–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 570–87 (2002) (comprehensively rejecting Justice
Scalia’s St. Cyr dissent).
35. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1206 (1992); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585,
636–38 (2009); Howard Jay Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV.
3, 3–4 (1954); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 610 (1993).
36. See Amar, supra note 35, at 1206–08.
37. Virtually all of THE FEDERALIST No. 84 was devoted to the idea that the Constitution’s
failure to specify certain rights should not be interpreted as a decision to exclude them. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton). The habeas privilege would be a particularly
poor candidate to read out of the Constitution because it is referenced in the Suspension Clause.
See Paschal, supra note 25, at 608–09, 611.
38. Parliament authorized King George III to suspend the privilege in the American
colonies during the Revolutionary War and renewed the suspension statute five times. Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Habeas Corpus Suspension Act,
1781, 21 Geo. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) (renewal); Continuance of Acts Act, 1780, 20 Geo. 3, c. 5 (Eng.)
(renewal); Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1779, 19 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Habeas Corpus
Suspension Act, 1778, 18 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Treason Act, 1777, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (Eng.).
39. The American colonists followed suspension activity in broadly circulated newspapers.
HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 253; JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 33 (2011).
40. Specifically, ten states voted on the proposed wording, and three states lodged the
initial objection that the privilege was not sufficiently secured: Georgia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina. GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 13, at 46; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). At least in St. Cyr, Justice Scalia makes
confused use of this information. He argued that four state ratifying conventions lodged an
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2. The State-Habeas Hypothesis
A moderated variation on the Scalia/Hollings position is
Professor William Duker’s argument that the original Constitution
contemplated a Type 3 privilege: a state privilege to contest federal
custody.42 This position has spawned some nuanced accounts that are
stronger than Duker’s,43 but I focus on Duker’s position in the interest
of space.44 State courts did frequently grant habeas relief for federal

objection to the Constitution’s failure to include express words of creation, and that such
objections indicate that the original meaning of the Suspension Clause was ambiguous. INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001). The states, however, were mollified by assurances that, despite
the peculiar wording of Article I, § 9, the habeas privilege was constitutionally secured. In other
words, the implication to be drawn from the objections of the state ratifying conventions and the
responses thereto is precisely the opposite of that advanced by Justice Scalia. Id.
41. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 780.
42. See DUKER, supra note 1, at 126–80. The appeal of a Type 3 privilege will not be
immediately apparent to most readers. Contrary to Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12
(1871) (holding that the Supremacy Clause precluded state courts from issuing writs of habeas
corpus for federal prisoners), states had all kinds of power to enforce federal law in state courts;
but the privilege referenced in the Suspension Clause is still a federal privilege. The argument
that the Suspension Clause referenced a state privilege to contest federal custody is less an
assessment of original meaning or intent and more of an attempt to reconcile a privilege with the
Madisonian Compromise and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803). Pursuant
to the Madisonian Compromise, there need be no inferior federal courts. Under Marbury, the
Supreme Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction other than that specified as original in
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. Id. If Congress eliminated the lower federal courts, and if the
Supreme Court could not issue habeas writs, then the only account on which there remains a
habeas remedy is if state courts provide it. For many people, then, a Type 3 privilege allows an
interpreter to honor the principle that there must always be some sort of available habeas
remedy. There nonetheless remain substantial problems with this version of the Type 3
privilege: it still gives short shrift to the importance of federal supremacy, and the pertinent
precedent cannot sustain interpretation necessary to make the theory work. Kovarsky, supra
note 8, at 792–94. For what it’s worth, were the Supreme Court to confront a situation where
Congress eliminated lower federal courts and the Justices were asked to exercise original habeas
jurisdiction, there are at least two options preferable to a holding that there is no habeas
guarantee. First, the Justices could have habeas relief in their individual capacities. Edward A.
Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 254 (2005). Second,
the Supreme Court could overturn Marbury’s interpretation of Article III, § 2, which many
believe Chief Justice Marshall concocted to force the constitutional conflict, giving rise to judicial
review. Kovarsky, supra note 8, 784–85 nn.168–77 and accompanying text (collecting authority).
43. Others have interpreted Supreme Court decisions rejecting the assertion of a state
privilege to contest federal custody as a statutory preemption question. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1510 (1987) (arguing that pertinent
cases should be read as rules about implied exclusivity of the federal habeas statute); David L.
Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59,
64 n.17 (2006) (endorsing the view that, because Congress need not ordain and establish lower
federal courts, the Suspension Clause restricts federal authority to interfere with a state
privilege in instances where there is no federal remedy).
44. For a more thorough treatment of the problems, see Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 786–92.
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custody during the early nineteenth century.45 Indeed, the use of state
habeas process to restrain a perceived federal leviathan might have
been normatively appealing to many at the end of the eighteenth
century. Just because state courts exercised habeas power to review
federal custody, however, does not mean that the Constitution
guaranteed it.
If the habeas privilege specified in the Suspension Clause
contemplated state habeas process, and if state process was the means
of securing the privilege, then one might expect to find a wealth of
nineteenth-century discussion about whether state limits on the
privilege were unconstitutional. I have yet to see any such discourse.
Nor do the list of restrictions on states appearing in Article I, Section
10 of the original Constitution suggest that states must honor a
habeas privilege. Professor Duker tries to skirt these objections by
contending that the Federal Constitution really made no habeas
guarantee whatsoever.46 In this respect, Professor Duker’s position
basically reduces to the Collings/Scalia argument, and it is vulnerable
to the same criticisms.47 For example, Professor Duker’s argument,
like the Collings/Scalia position, selectively quotes Alexander
Hamilton48 and incorrectly interprets explanations provided to state
ratifying conventions as excluding a federal privilege.49
In any event, the Supreme Court invalidated state habeas
power to discharge federal prisoners in two cases bookending the Civil
War: Ableman v. Booth50 and Tarble’s Case.51 Tarble expresses a
general view of judicial power that is inconsistent with virtually
everything we know about the concurrency of state jurisdiction.52
45. See In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 592, 594–95 (N.Y. 1867) (collecting cases); DUKER, supra
note 1, at 178 n.192 (same); see also Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery,
Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (“At the very
beginning of the nineteenth century, most state courts continued to draw their authority to issue
the writ from their common-law powers which preceded independence.”).
46. DUKER, supra note 1, at 155 (“[The Federal Constitution] did not provide security
against state interference, nor did it require a state to provide for the writ.”).
47. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing these criticisms in greater detail).
48. Compare DUKER, supra note 1, at 133 (evaluating Hamilton’s position) with THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 83 and 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the habeas privilege was
provided for “in the plan of the convention” and observing that New York law lacked the
protection for the privilege appearing in the Federal Constitution).
49. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 791–92.
50. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514 (1859).
51. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409–10 (1871).
52. Tarble suggests that state courts lack the authority to enforce federal law. See id. at
407 (“[N]either [National nor State government] can intrude with its judicial process into the
domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National
government . . . .”). In fact, state courts were the primary forum for federal questions for many
years, until Congress permanently vested lower federal courts with general federal question
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Although the Court reasons from this problematic generalization, it
reaches a specific conclusion that is probably right for other reasons.
As a practical matter, state habeas power to discharge federal
prisoners would seriously disrupt the operative supremacy of federal
law.53 Moreover, the English concept of a suspended privilege strongly
suggests that suspension power vests in the sovereign that provides
the privilege to contest custody.54 Put differently, the Constitution
would not have vested a federal suspension power unless federal
courts were the forum intended to adjudicate the privilege.55 Finally,
even if Tarble was wrongly decided, the result would be that state
courts were permitted to exercise habeas power, not that Type 3
features were the subject of the constitutional guarantee.
3. A Privilege to a Federal Forum
Insofar as the original Constitution is concerned, the remaining
privilege possibilities are both federal. Privilege Type 1 is a federal
privilege to contest federal custody, and privilege Type 2 is a federal
privilege to contest state custody. In Habeas Power, I argued at length
that the original Constitution contemplated only a federal habeas
forum to contest federal custody: a Type 1 privilege.56 Professor Eric
Freedman has argued forcefully that the original Constitution secured
a habeas privilege with both Type 1 and Type 2 features,57 but I part
jurisdiction in 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (“[T]he circuit courts of the
United States shall have original cognizance . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . .”); cf. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477–78 (1981) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that, pursuant to intended
constitutional design, state courts routinely adjudicate Article III subject matter); LARRY W.
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 152–53 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing that Tarble belies “the conventional
understanding that Congress might never have created the lower federal courts and might have
relied, instead, on state courts to police the system”).
53. Those reading Tarble as an implied preemption case—a theory identified in note 43,
supra—would argue that the supremacy-inhibiting features of a Type 3 privilege would be
minimal because Congress could simply pass a federal habeas statute to short-circuit officious
state habeas activity.
54. The English “privilege” was suspended by the sovereign, and the habeas benefit was
denominated as a privilege of English subjecthood because it entailed access to a court deriving
its power from that same English sovereign. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 762.
55. The states might “suspend” their own habeas privileges, but the Framers would not
have used the word “suspend” to refer to federal interference with a state privilege.
56. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–94; see also Developments in the Law—Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1267 (1970) (“The framers’ decision to single out habeas
corpus for particular protection against congressional ‘suspension’ suggests that they assumed
that habeas jurisdiction would exist in some court for federal prisoners.”).
57. See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 14–19, 29 (“[A]lmost all of the participants in the
ratification debates expected the Clause to protect the independent judicial examination on
federal habeas corpus of all imprisonments, state or federal.”).
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ways with Professor Freedman for reasons that I will elaborate upon
shortly.
Absent a statute meeting the suspension criteria, any
legislation substantially restricting judicial power corresponding with
the Type 1 privilege is and always has been, in my view,
unconstitutional.58 The idea that the privilege in the original
Constitution had Type 2 features—that it entailed federal power to
review state custody—is a more difficult sell. Whatever the Framers
actually thought, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not provide for federal
habeas review of state custody. The Act stated, “[W]rits of habeas
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in [jail], unless where they
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same . . . .”59
Congress enacted limited habeas review of certain types of state
custody in 1833 and again in 1842,60 but did not ratify a generally
applicable state-prisoner privilege until 1867.61
Professor Freedman has argued that, in Ex parte Bollman,62
Chief Justice Marshall incorrectly interpreted the grant of habeas
jurisdiction in the 1789 Judiciary Act.63 Chief Justice Marshall
observed that federal courts could not conduct habeas review of state
custody,64 and Professor Freedman argues that Bollman set the
United States down the course of law that erroneously restricted
federal habeas relief.65 I agree with parts of Professor Freedman’s
account. Specifically, I agree that Chief Justice Marshall made mince
meat of section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act; but even a proper
interpretation of section 14 still would have given federal courts or
58. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795 (“It is federal judicial power to determine whether a
federal prisoner’s custody is unconstitutional . . . . Congress may not break this prerogative
under legislative saddle . . . .”).
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789).
60. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (“[A]ny district court of the United
States . . . in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner . . . in custody . . . of the United States, or any one of
them.”); Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634–35 (extending the writ to all prisoners
confined under authority of federal law).
61. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
62. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (Cranch 4) 75 (1807).
63. See Eric Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex parte
Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 536 (2000) (“[T]he mistake is that, according to
dicta inserted by Chief Justice John Marshall into Ex Parte Bollman, Section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 withheld from state prioners access to the federal writ . . . ”).
64. See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 99 (opining that the proviso at the end of section 14 applied to
the first sentence, as well as the second).
65. See Freedman, supra note 63, at 537 (“Marshall’s misreading . . . survives to cloud
Suspension Clause Analysis.”).
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judges no power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to
state custodians.66 Perhaps more importantly, a successful theory
probably has to accommodate the consequences of Chief Justice
Marshall’s interpretation: until Congress changed the habeas statute
in 1867, courts generally ruled that state prisoners could not invoke
the federal privilege to relieve unlawful custody.67
In fact, many who believe that federal prisoners are entitled to
a federal habeas forum nonetheless deny a constitutional guarantee
for state prisoners.68 That result is normatively appealing to those
who believe that, with respect to enforcing constitutional guarantees,
state judges have brains and will equal to those of their federal
counterparts.69 For many, the specter of lower federal judges using
habeas process to review state judgments is, at best, “unseemly.”70
The varied privilege configurations and corresponding
implications yield the simple question I posed at the outset: Is there
any persuasive account on which the Constitution guarantees a
federal habeas forum to state prisoners? (There is.) Moreover, if I
concede that the Constitution did not originally guarantee a privilege
with Type 2 features, can that account be developed on the back of
some other substantial constitutional event? (It can.)
66. The proviso at the end of section 14 may have restricted only the habeas power given to
federal judges in the second sentence, and not the habeas power given to federal courts in the
first sentence. Indeed, that distinction is the crux of Professor Freedman’s argument. See id. at
575–76 (“Soundly read, the proviso limits judges but not courts.”). I am nonetheless skeptical
that the first sentence of section 14 was intended to give courts the authority to issue writs of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; the better reading is that the first sentence was vesting federal
courts with authority to issue other kinds of habeas writs auxiliary to other forms of jurisdiction.
See Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT.
REV. 153, 176.
67. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1845) (rejecting proposition that habeas relief
might issue simply because state law “was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States”).
On several occasions, federal judges expressed frustration that they lacked habeas power to
relieve unlawful custody. See, e.g., Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496–97 (C.C.D.S.C.
1823) (holding that, even though state act should be void as unconstitutional, there was no
federal habeas remedy); Ex parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964, 966 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (statement of
Washington, J.) (expressing principle that federal courts may not relieve even illegal state
custody).
68. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 64 (1956) (“Nor is it likely that
the Court would presently accept the rather elaborate argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment retroactively inflated the scope of the constitutional privilege to include the newly
created federal rights to protection against state action.”).
69. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 504 (1963) (“[R]esentment among state . . . judges, many of
them surely as conscientious in their adherence to the Constitution and as intellectually honest
as their critics, counsels . . . against . . . indiscriminate expansion [of habeas jurisdiction] without
principled justification.”).
70. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
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The PI Clause declared that a federal privilege for state
prisoners was incident to national citizenship. I have located two other
major attempts to deduce a general Type 2 privilege from some
features of the Reconstruction Amendments,71 but they are deficient in
respects that I will address in Section III.C. Even after identifying the
Fourteenth Amendment as the constitutional event guaranteeing a
modified privilege, the account must still show how the Type 1
privilege gains Type 2 features upon contact with the PI Clause. The
challenge is to show that the PI Clause extended the guarantee of a
federal forum to state prisoners.
C. The Stakes
If the PI Clause guarantees a privilege with Type 2 features,
then Congress cannot repeal the judicial power that secures it.
Although a repeal scenario is farfetched, scenarios in which Congress
imposes substantial statutory restrictions are not. In fact, many
restrictive scenarios have already materialized,72 often precipitating
dramatic institutional and academic clashes over state-prisoner
remedies.73
If the Federal Constitution does not require a federal habeas
privilege for state prisoners—and if the greater legislative power to
revoke the privilege includes the lesser power to limit it—then there
can be little dispute as to the constitutionality of limiting federal
habeas power over state custodians. Establishing the constitutional

71. See Michael P. O’Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia About the History
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 KY. L.J. 659, 662 (2005) (contending that the PI clause
means that Congress may not strip federal habeas jurisdiction over “claims predicated upon
race-based deprivation of liberty”); Steiker, supra note 4, at 867–68 (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment “incorporates” the habeas privilege against the states through the DP Clause, with
the process of incorporation transforming the habeas privilege into one that may reach state
custody).
72. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012) (imposing various restrictions on claims appearing
in successive habeas petitions lodged by state inmates); id. § 2244(d) (creating a statute of
limitations applicable to all federal habeas claims by state inmates); id. § 2254(d)(1) (excepting
from the general rule—that federal habeas relief is unavailable for claims decided on the merits
in state court—cases where the state decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64
(1996) (deciding the constitutionality of AEDPA restriction on successive state-prisoner
petitions).
73. Compare, e.g., Bator, supra note 69, at 463–64 (depicting mid-twentieth-century
Supreme Court law permitting extensive habeas relitigation by state inmates as an expansion
from previous understandings of the writ), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 661–63 (1982) (arguing that Professor
Bator’s theory of the federal privilege for state inmates was too restrictive). Professors Bator and
Peller are the two figures most readily associated with the two major sides in the debate.
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status of a Type 2 privilege is therefore a necessary precondition to
any argument that there might be something other than popular will
resisting its contraction.
III. THE HABEAS PRIVILEGE OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Among other things, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
embraced the concept of national citizenship: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”74
Setting aside momentarily that The Slaughter-House Cases
forever disfigured the PI Clause,75 the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that the habeas privilege belonged to a set of
privileges and immunities defined by national citizenship. And, even
after Slaughter-House, the habeas privilege remains one of the few
lifelike features of an otherwise “cadaverous” constitutional
provision.76 Those of all interpretive stripes should be able to agree
that the PI Clause encompasses the habeas privilege.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment traffics in two kinds of
status: personhood and citizenship. The PI Clause was, in part, a
simple response to the Black Codes and their enabling precedent,77
Dred Scott v. Sandford.78 Dred Scott, of course, held that African
Americans were persons but not U.S. citizens—that they were not
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1872).
76. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
180 (1989).
77. More precisely, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012)), was targeted at the Black Codes, and the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to constitutionalize the nondiscrimination rules that the Civil Rights Act
contained, and also to establish a clear textual source of congressional power to pass civil rights
legislation. See George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused
and Confused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 309, 312–13. Several scholars have argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s exclusive purpose was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act, most
notably Raoul Berger. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 457–58 (2d ed. 1977) (“The historical records all but
incontrovertibly establish that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . confined it to
protection of carefully enumerated rights against State discrimination.”). I obviously join a
crowded group rejecting that view. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 63 (1988) (“The debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment were. . . debates about high politics and fundamental principles . . . . The debates by
themselves did not reduce the vague, open-ended, and sometimes clashing principles used by the
debaters to precise, carefully bounded legal doctrine. That would be the task of the courts . . . .”).
78. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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constitutionally entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities of
national citizenship.79 Section 1’s first sentence straightforwardly
rebuked Dred Scott: “[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States . . . are citizens of the United States.”80 The second sentence of
Section 1, among other things, forbids states from abridging the
privileges and immunities of “citizens of the United States.”81 The
formula is elegant and powerful: the Fourteenth Amendment declares
a national citizenship, binds it to a bundle of privileges and
immunities, and prohibits states from abridging them. The syllogistic
conclusion is unavoidable. If all persons born or naturalized in the
United States are entitled to rights of national citizenship, and if a
person is born in the United States, then that person is entitled to the
privileges and immunities that such status entails. Part III explains
that, no matter what position one takes on Slaughter-House and the
potential meaning of the PI Clause, the bundle of national citizenship
rights includes a habeas privilege.
I should quickly pause to comment on methodology. The
account I advance here is appealing in part because it need not reduce
to a debate about the proper approach to constitutional interpretation
and construction. My account can be sustained without fervent
commitment to any strain of textualism or originalism, and without
an adventurous foray into the cluster of theories we might describe
under the umbrella of “living constitutionalism.” Nor do I need a
global interpretive theory to justify cherry-picked precedent; one of my
account’s signal virtues is its consistency with Slaughter-House and
its progeny.82 The only interpretive proposition upon which my
account relies is the rather boring idea that judges should follow legalprocess norms of judging: they should strive to cohere various sources
of law as expressed in judicial decisions, authoritative texts, and
normed behavior.83 The strength of my account is that it exhibits such
coherence, unlike other theories under which Congress enjoys only
limited authority to restrict habeas review of state custody.

79. See id. at 407 (“[N]either the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor
their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the
people . . . ”).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. Id.
82. See infra Part III.B (describing the difficulties precedent has created for incorporation
analysis).
83. Readers may recognize this interpretive position as Professor Richard Fallon’s
“constructivist coherence” theory. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–93 (1987).
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A. Original Meaning
The Thirty-Ninth Congress submitted the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states,84 and it also passed the Reconstruction Act
requiring that the rebellious states ratify the Amendment as a
precondition to restoration.85 When the first session opened, neither
house of Congress would seat members from the former confederacy. 86
Of the Congressmen seated for the first session, roughly seventy-five
percent were Republican. Understanding the internal dynamics of
that Republican coalition is indispensible to interpreting the
Amendment.87
The legislators framing and states ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment understood the habeas privilege referenced in the
Suspension Clause to be a “privilege . . . of citizens of the United
States.”88 The relationship runs far deeper than the superficial
observation that the word “privilege” appears in both constitutional
provisions. In fact, the habeas privilege was one of the central rights
contemplated by the PI Clause. The Supreme Court ultimately
gummed up application of the PI Clause, but I will not take up the
decisional mayhem until Section III.B. The starting points for
understanding how members of the so-called Rump Congress and
their constituents viewed privileges and immunities of citizenship are
(1) the “privileges and immunities” language in Article IV,89 and (2)
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148–49 (1866).
85. Republican members struggled with the other sections in the Amendment: voting
qualifications for disloyal citizens and how to calibrate congressional representation to reflect the
anticipated disenfranchisement of freedmen. See JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 8–9 (1997) (“[T]he
debates did not focus primarily on Section 1, which today is the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead,
the debates focused on . . . Negro suffrage[,] . . . apportionment and . . . exclusion of rebel leaders
from office.”).
86. Barry Friedman, This History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:
Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2002).
87. A few things about that coalition are worth mentioning. First, labels that are often
used to classify the Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress—“radical,” “moderate,” and
“conservative”—are most meaningful for the purposes of lining up membership on the issue of
black suffrage, but are less useful for classifying membership with respect to other
Reconstruction questions. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 47–48 (1965) (“Disagreeing by varying degrees
with . . . the moderates, the radical Republicans nevertheless joined them in admitting that a
constitutional amendment would principally enfranchise the northern Negro.”). Second, any
assertion about what the coalition intended or what the words it produced meant cannot be
divorced from the unique historical phenomena driving Congress to recommend the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states. Third, the Republicans fought extensively over the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but not so much over the content of § 1. See BOND, supra note 85.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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Corfield v. Coryell,90 the canonical circuit court decision interpreting
that Article IV content.
1. The Comity Clause
The taut textual string of “privilege,” “immunity,” and
“citizens” appeared originally in Article IV, and that constitutional
provision informs the meaning of the PI Clause. Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1—styled the “Comity Clause”—provides that “[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.” Right off the bat, the Comity Clause
differs meaningfully from the PI Clause. Article IV features a
restriction involving “Citizens of each State,” and the Fourteenth
Amendment addresses the treatment of “citizens of the United
States.” Article IV deals (perhaps exclusively) with the rights of state
citizenship, and the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the rights of
national citizenship. Those two phenomena may intersect
substantially—a right might be incident to both state and national
citizenship—although Slaughter-House basically defined that
intersecting set out of existence.91
The Comity Clause was and remains subject to multiple
interpretations. Radical, Moderate, and Conservative Republicans in
the Thirty-Ninth Congress sat on a spectrum of Article IV
interpretation, and the features of that spectrum are important pieces
of the PI Clause puzzle. Most agree that the Comity Clause entitles
citizens of a state to something; and then the plausible interpretations
splinter. One might plot the interpretive variation on two axes: (1) the
meaning of “privileges and immunities,”92 and (2) the degree to which

90. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
91. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872) (“[T]he privileges and
immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the States as such,
and that they are left to the State governments for security and protection, and not by this
article placed under the special care of the Federal government . . . .”).
92. Under one school of thought, “privileges and immunities” referred to all rights under
state law. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (“[T]he privileges and immunities
secured to citizens of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those
privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their
constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens.”). Under another interpretation, the terms
included a set of natural rights. See infra Part III.A.2. Under still another, the phrase included
rights enumerated in the Constitution. See, e.g., Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J.
785, 816 (1982) (“The legal-linguistic history presented here shows that privileges and
immunities [in Article IV] meant constitutional limitations.”). The important point was that,
even for interpretations under which the Comity Clause was a nondiscrimination rule, it forbade
only alienage disability involving “privileges and immunities.”
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the Comity Clause imposed a rule of nondiscrimination instead of a
rule of categorical prohibition.93
Pivotal Republican constituencies responsible for guiding the
Fourteenth Amendment through Congress generally believed one of
three things about the Comity Clause: (1) that, as of the Civil War, it
did protect privileges and immunities of national citizenship;94 (2) that
it had at one point been intended to protect privileges and immunities
of national citizenship but had incorrectly been interpreted primarily
to do other things;95 or (3) that it had never furnished either a
nondiscrimination or an absolute rule regarding privileges and
immunities of national citizenship, and that the omission needed to be
rectified.96
93. Some have argued that the Comity Clause was more than a rule of nondiscrimination—
that it prohibited states from imposing even nondiscriminatory restrictions on “privileges and
immunities.” See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) (arguing
that the Comity Clause actually restricted any sovereign interference with natural rights). That
group would presumably consider “Comity Clause” a misnomer. A subcategory of people
subscribing to this view of the Comity Clause believed that the privileges and immunities in
question—for which even nondiscriminatory burdens were impermissible—included rights
enumerated in the Constitution. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114–15 (1986) (reciting pedigree of this
position).
94. Joel Tiffany, who was a lawyer and the reporter for the New York Supreme Court,
wrote the influential Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery in 1849. In it, he argued that
state legislation depriving citizens of privileges or immunities was void, a principle that the
federal judiciary had to enforce. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 42–44 (“Tiffany concluded that
slavery was unconstitutional, even in the state. Slaves were citizens.”). Tiffany’s treatise
influenced a small set of Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress who believed that Article IV
was more than a rule of nondiscrimination. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the
States Revisited After Heller, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1487 (2009) (describing Tiffany’s impact on
the Heller decision and subsequent Republican views).
95. John Bingham, discussed infra in notes 97–104 and accompanying text, belonged to
this group. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 182–85
(1998). In part for this reason, he believed the Fourteenth Amendment—and its grant of
enforcement powers to Congress in § 5—was necessary to establish that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was a lawful exercise of legislative authority. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1093,
1291 (1866) (“Where is the power in Congress, unless this or some similar amendment be
adopted, to prevent the reenactment of those infernal [Black Codes.]”); Michael Kent Curtis,
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases
Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV.
1, 33 (1996):
Bingham pointed out that Barron held the Bill of Rights amendments did not limit
the states nor, he insisted, did the Constitution provide for congressional enforcement
of the Bill of Rights against state action. He insisted that a constitutional amendment
was needed to allow Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights by passing the Civil Rights
Bill.
96. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 114 (“The clause was . . . not intended to control the
powers of state governments . . . , but simply to ensure that a migrant citizen would enjoy the
basic rights a state accorded to its own citizens.”).
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John Bingham, a conservative Ohio Republican who belonged
to the third group,97 was one of the most influential Republicans in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress.98 Historian Michael Les Benedict concluded
that Bingham “led . . . nonradicals in the House” and had “greater
influence on the course of Reconstruction” than did radical leaders
such as Thaddeus Stevens.99 Bingham belonged to the hugely powerful
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, charged with reporting the
Fourteenth Amendment.100 He drafted various iterations of Section 1
and shepherded the Amendment through the House. Justice Hugo
Black called Bingham the James Madison of Section 1,101 and
historians interpreting the Amendment have spent decades
harvesting Bingham’s speeches and writings for Fourteenth
Amendment meaning.102 Bingham had stated that the Section 1
prototype was patterned on Article IV, Section 2.103 He believed,
however, that the Comity Clause should have been interpreted not
just as a nondiscrimination rule, but as a categorical protection for
privileges and immunities of national citizenship.104 Many of
Bingham’s Republican colleagues agreed with his interpretation.
Jacob Howard, a Michigan Senator who was also a member of
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was the Republican point
97. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, 27 (1974) (listing members of factions in the
38–40 Congresses).
98. See id. at 31, 36, 57, 143, 162–87 (identifying Bingham as a “Representative[ ] with preeminent influence”).
99. Id. at 36.
100. Id. at 143.
101. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 73–74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Yet
Congressman Bingham may, without extravagance, be called the Madison of the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
102. See, e.g., GERARD M. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 334 (2011) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part II] (arguing that
Bingham did not rely on Article IV when drafting the final version of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Several scholars have been critical of Bingham’s intellect and therefore critical of
arguments that attribute interpretive significance to what he said. See id. at 335 n.23 (showing
that some scholars were distrustful of Bingham as a source of information).
103. In a debate that took place on February 26, 1866, Congressman Bingham argued that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that he had
authored protected the same rights found in the text of Article IV, other existing constitutional
provisions, and the Supremacy Clause. William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities"
Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 171 (2002) (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
104. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 115 (stating that Bingham read Article IV, Section 2 “to
protect privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, including rights in the Bill of
Rights, from state interference”).
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person in the Senate.105 His understanding of Section 1 is particularly
important because, although technically classified by historians as a
radical, he commanded the respect of the conservative flank of Senate
Republicans—probably the conservative bound of the coalition
necessary to push the Amendment through Congress.106 Howard’s
reading of the Comity Clause appeared to differ from Bingham’s,107
but that disagreement was unimportant in light of their shared
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth
Amendment framers had revised Section 1 to clarify that, no matter
the proper Comity Clause interpretation, the PI Clause categorically
protected privileges and immunities incident to a national citizenship
that the Amendment would formally declare.
So Bingham, Howard, and their fellow congressional travelers
understood that the PI Clause protected privileges and immunities of
national citizenship, and they believed that (at least some)
enumerated constitutional guarantees qualified.108 Given the virtually
undisputed understanding that the PI Clause would declare privileges
and immunities of national citizenship, and bar states from abridging
them,109 the next logical question involves what those privileges and
immunities are. More specifically, do they include the habeas
privilege? Enter Corfield.110
2. Corfield v. Coryell
For almost two hundred years, the leading case interpreting
the meaning of “privileges and immunities” has been Corfield v.

105. See Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note 102, at 359. Howard’s Senate responsibility was
something of an accident. Senator William Fessenden actually helmed the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction—which had developed the Amendment—but Fessenden assigned management
responsibilities to Howard when Fessenden became ill. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 184.
106. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 38 (Henry Wilson and Jacob Howard “had the
confidence of more conservative Republication Senators and thus had larger impact on
Reconstruction legislation than their more belligerent allies.”); 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 278 (1927).
107. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 115 n.162 (stating that Howard may not have accepted
Bingham’s view).
108. See BERGER, supra note 77, at 38 (providing the Congressmen’s views of the rights that
would “clothe the Negro”).
109. Although his theory is an outlier, Professor John Harrison has argued—with
characteristic force and panache—that the PI Clause was simply a rule of nondiscrimination
forbidding more than distinctions based on alienage. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (“The main point of the clause
is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenshipthe
same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forthto all of its citizens.”).
110. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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Coryell,111 an opinion that Justice Bushrod Washington issued while
riding circuit. New Jersey had prohibited any person that was not an
“actual inhabitant or resident” from raking oysters in state waters.112
Corfield claimed that the Comity Clause barred New Jersey from
discriminating, based on alienage, with respect to oyster-raking
rights.113 Justice Washington held that an oyster-raking right was not
covered under the Comity Clause because it was not a privilege or
immunity of citizens, and in the process he announced a now-famous
inventory of those concepts.114 (The idea that Corfield distinguished
between the incidents of state and national citizenship came later.115)
Justice Washington expressed “no hesitation” in limiting
privileges and immunities of citizens to those “which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union.”116 He then
lists some members of what I will call the “Corfield inventory”: the
rights to the protection of government, to the enjoyment of life and
liberty, to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, to reside anywhere
and to travel as necessary to work, to have contractual capacities
honored, to sue in state court, to hold and alienate property, to be
subject to nondiscriminatory taxation, and a few others.117 Most
importantly, Justice Washington observed that the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states included the right “to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.”118
The Corfield inventory was the primary decisional reference
point for Fourteenth Amendment framers contemplating the meaning
of “privileges or immunities.”119 Senator Howard, in his remarks on
the chamber floor, underscored that the PI Clause encompassed the
privileges and immunities described in Corfield.120 In introducing a
passage from Corfield, which he read into the Congressional Record,
Howard stated:
111. Id. at 549.
112. Id. at 550.
113. See id. at 551 (“The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states?”).
114. See id. at 551–52.
115. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Slaughter-House opinion).
116. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
117. Id. at 551–52.
118. Id. at 552.
119. See AMAR, supra note 95, at 176 (pointing to Corfield as the “leading comity clause case
on the books in 1866”).
120. For the record of what Senator Howard said, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2764–65 (1866).
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But we may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary
by referring to [Corfield] . . . and I will trouble the Senate but for a moment by reading
what that very learned and excellent Judge [Washington] says about these privileges
and immunities of the citizens of each State in the several States.121

The list of immunities that Howard used Corfield to identify included
“the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.”122 The public understood
Howard’s position; the New York Times reported details of Howard’s
famous speech on the front page.123
Other prominent advocates of the Amendment trotted out the
Corfield inventory whenever they were pressed to explain the
meaning of Section 1. Senator Lyman Trumbull was the coauthor of
the Thirteenth Amendment and a pivotal Republican figure in passing
the Fourteenth. In promoting the Civil Rights Act of 1866,124 Trumbull
described Justice Washington’s opinion as the “most elaborate upon”
the meaning of “privileges and immunities,” and he read the Corfield
inventory—including the reference to the habeas privilege—into the
Congressional Record.125 Trumbull’s view is particularly important
because he was a primary exponent of the contemporaneous
legislation expanding the habeas privilege to reach state custody.126
James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, also read
into the record the Corfield inventory, including the habeas
privilege.127 Even academics who argue that the PI Clause did not
apply the Bill to the states make their argument by positioning
Corfield as the exhaustive list of privileges and immunities incident to
national citizenship.128
There was obviously disagreement between Democrats and
Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and the Republican
coalition was more heterogeneous than many treatments of the
Fourteenth Amendment imply.129 Notwithstanding all of that
differentiation, virtually everyone in the Thirty-Ninth Congress
understood (1) that the PI Clause barred some state action with
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Corfield).
123. See N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1.
124. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
125. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Session, 474–75 (1866).
126. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text (discussing Trumbull’s actions).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Session, 1117–18 (1866).
128. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 77, at 22, 36, 41, 43 (concluding that Corfield and the
rights secured by the Civil Rights Act were exhaustive of “privileges or immunities” referenced in
Fourteenth Amendment); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 673–75 (1979) (concluding that Corfield’s list exhausts the
definition of “privileges or immunities”).
129. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 21 (describing the types of Republicans during the
Reconstruction).
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respect to privileges and immunities bound to a person’s status as a
U.S. citizen,130 and (2) that those privileges and immunities included a
habeas privilege.131
B. The Minefield of Incorporation Precedent
Few have given much thought to how contact with the
Fourteenth Amendment affected the habeas privilege. The oversight
reflects the interpretive difficulties that the exercise presents. The
relationship has also been neglected because of the academic capital
committed to whether and how the Fourteenth Amendment
“incorporates” the Bill, and the fact that the privilege is a right not
enumerated there.
As all law students learn, the Fourteenth Amendment contains
two potential devices for incorporating rights against the states: the
PI Clause and the DP Clause. The Supreme Court threw an early
wrench into incorporation, snuffing the PI Clause in SlaughterHouse.132 As a result, most incorporation has been left to the DP
Clause.133 The meaning of each Clause has been warped around how
programmatically it applies the Bill against the states and how much
discretion it affords Justices to develop unenumerated rights. The
thrust and parry of incorporation combat is well known,134 as are the
130. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the original meaning of the Comity Clause).
131. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Corfield case).
132. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
133. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 171–96 (discussing how the courts viewed incorporation).
134. Basically, the Supreme Court deployed the Due Process Clause to do the incorporation
work that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had probably intended for the PI Clause.
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the PI clause after Slaughter-House). Different Justices became
associated with each of three different incorporation paradigms. Justice Black was a champion of
“total” or “mechanical” incorporation, which embraced the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to incorporate the first eight Amendments in the Bill, and nothing else. See Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Sixth
Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
68–123 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Frankfurter advocated more fluid use of the Due Process
Clause to force states to observe rights that are principles of fundamental fairness and implicit
in ordered liberty. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offenses.
Justice Brennan charted a middle ground frequently described as “selective incorporation,” in
which the Supreme Court determines, clause-by-clause, whether rights enumerated in the Bill
were sufficiently fundamental to be applied against the states via the Due Process Clause. See
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the “Fifth Amendment's exception from
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combatants.135 Although some discussion of incorporation is
appropriate, I forego unnecessary detail and note simply that
“incorporation mechanics” refers to two-step Fourteenth Amendment
theories in which (1) a right is identified and (2) state action impairing
it is prohibited.
The strength of my account is largely unaffected by one’s view
of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation mechanics, for two reasons.
First, even after Slaughter-House, precedent leaves no doubt that the
habeas privilege is one of the few “privilege[s] or immunit[ies] of [U.S.]
citizens” covered by the PI Clause. Second, my account does not really
involve the second mechanical step of incorporation at all. The PI
Clause declared a habeas privilege of national citizenship that is
enforceable against the federal government, a function that is
independent of how the Amendment activated rights against the
states.
1. How Slaughter-House Marginalized the PI Clause
Slaughter-House is the big reason why so many overlook the
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the habeas privilege. In
Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court disabled the PI Clause by paring
the covered privileges and immunities down to a thin sliver.136 As it
turns out, a signal virtue of my account is that the habeas privilege
still occupies that real estate.

compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
abridgment by the States.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154–60 (1961) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth); Ohio ex
rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–76 (1960) (discussing the different views on what the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates).
135. The generative academic event was Justice Black’s dissent in Adamson, which three
other Justices joined. Justice Black argued at length that the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose
was to incorporate, almost exclusively, the privileges and immunities enumerated in the Bill. See
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68–123 (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Black’s Adamson dissent provoked a
snarling 139-page response by Professor Charles Fairman. See Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 5, 5 (1949). Professor William Crosskey was the first major academic defender of Justice
Black and critic of Professor Fairman. See 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1083–175, 1381 n.11 (1953); William
Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–119 (1954). Justice Black’s dissent and Professor
Fairman’s article have become elemental subjects for subsequent generations of influential
incorporation scholars. See Amar, supra note 35, at 1194 (naming a few of these scholars,
including Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan, Henry Friendly, William Crosskey,
Louis Henkin, Erwin Griswold, and John Ely).
136. See infra notes 140–49 and accompanying text.
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Courts have largely interpreted the Article IV Comity Clause
as a rule of nondiscrimination: states could not impose alienage
disability with respect to privileges and immunities.137 The PI Clause,
on the other hand, was an absolute limit on government power to
impair privileges or immunities of citizens, even if the impairment
was nondiscriminatory.138 Slaughter-House held that there was
another salient distinction between the Comity and PI Clauses: that
between rights of state citizenship and rights of national
citizenship.139
The Slaughter-House Cases were six consolidated appeals.140
Each involved the same Louisiana charter granting an exclusive
privilege to butcher livestock around New Orleans.141 The cases
collectively presented the question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment created an individual right to challenge a state-created
monopoly—and, more abstractly, what kinds of individual rights the
Amendment recognized as “privileges or immunities” enforceable
against the states.142
The Supreme Court’s answer was “not many.” Slaughter-House
held that the Fourteenth Amendment merely barred States from
abridging privileges or immunities incident to national citizenship.143
The list of national privileges and immunities is thin: to travel to the
seat of government, to petition the federal government to redress
grievances, to transact with it, to travel within the states, to access
seaports, and a few others.144 Slaughter-House held that the PI Clause
did not bar the States from abridging privileges and immunities
incident to state citizenship,145 which are subject only to the Comity
Clause’s nondiscrimination rule.
Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion is logically
problematic for a number of reasons. First, privileges and immunities
137. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People's Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitution's Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1954 n.68 (2012) (“The clause
has long been understood to mean that states cannot discriminate on the basis of an American
citizen's state citizenship.”).
138. But cf. Harrison, supra note 109, at 1388 (arguing that PI Clause should be read as a
nondiscrimination rule).
139. See infra notes 140–49 and accompanying text. For a defense of this distinction, see
Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note 102, at 336–37.
140. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (caption).
141. See id. at 59 (discussing the Louisiana charter).
142. See id. at 72–73.
143. See id. at 73–74.
144. Id. at 79–80.
145. See id. at 74 (“It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States,
and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.”).
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of state citizenship might also be privileges and immunities of
national citizenship.146 Second, the Corfield inventory reads far more
naturally as a set of rights incident to citizenship generally than it
does as a set incident only to state citizenship.147 Third, Justice
Miller’s textual analysis treated “privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States” as tantamount to “privileges or immunities
unique to national citizenship.” Fourth, any distinct set of national
privileges and immunities is much broader than Justice Miller defined
it.148 Finally, the opinion seemed to ignore the basic structural
changes wrought by the Civil War and Reconstruction.149 Whatever
combination of misgivings one might have about Slaughter-House,
though, it has not been overruled. As a result, the PI Clause remains
largely unavailable to litigants seeking to enforce most individual
rights against the States.
Despite the pronounced Supreme Court division in SlaughterHouse—four Justices generated three different dissents—the one
thing upon which all Justices seemed to agree was that the habeas
guarantee reflected in the Suspension Clause was a privilege of
national citizenship. The majority’s primary objective was to exclude
the ability to challenge a slaughter-house monopoly from the bundle of
privileges and immunities incident to national citizenship. And in
order to show that the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship was not a null set, Justice Miller listed several examples—
including the “privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”150 He also

146. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 646–48 (1994) (“Many of
the same rights are protected by both the state and the federal constitutions.”).
147. Justice Miller accomplished this feat by misquoting the Comity Clause. He
paraphrased it as relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens “of the several States,” but
the Comity clause involves the privileges and immunities of citizens “in the several States.” See
LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE
THE CONSTITUTION 194–95 (1975) (explaining how Justice Miller’s opinion misquotes the
Constitution).
148. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that, if the PI Clause “only refers . . . to such privileges and immunities as were before
its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to
citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and
most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”).
149. See Walter Dellinger, Remarks on Jeffrey Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1294 (1998):
The more fundamental error of Slaughter-House was its failure fully to recognize that
the nation fought a great Civil War and in its aftermath changed the fundamental law
of the republic. Slaughter-House erred by resurrecting antebellum presuppositions of
state primacy and state autonomy that had been the justifications of the Confederacy.
That mistake dwarfs . . . any concern about which clause the Court got wrong.
150. Id. at 79.
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described the privilege as a “right[ ] of the citizen guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.”151
Justice Field dissented and was joined by all other dissenters:
Justices Swayne and Bradley, as well as Chief Justice Chase. For
these dissenters, the PI Clause did not refer merely to privileges and
immunities of national citizens qua national citizenship, but to
privileges and immunities that “of right belong to the citizens of all
free governments.”152 They believed that the PI Clause reached a
bundle of privileges and immunities at least as broad as the Corfield
inventory. And among those privileges and immunities mentioned by
Justice Washington in Corfield was the right to “claim the benefit of
the writ of habeas corpus.”153
There were two other dissenting opinions. Justice Bradley
wrote to underscore the idea that rights of state and national
citizenship were identical, and that one “of these rights was that of
habeas corpus, or the right of having any invasion of personal liberty
judicially examined into, at once, by a competent judicial
magistrate.”154 Justice Bradley also quoted the Corfield excerpt
explicitly mentioning habeas corpus.155 Justice Swayne’s dissent was
more cryptic,156 but he joined the dissents of both Justices Field and
Bradley.157 Ultimately, the Justices in Slaughter-House did not agree
on much, but the proposition that the PI Clause included the habeas
privilege commanded unanimous support.
2. The PI Clause after Slaughter-House
Slaughter-House announced that the rights associated with
state and national citizenship were distinct, and the habeas privilege
151. Id.
152. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
153. To add insult to injury, worth mentioning is that, if Justice Miller were correct and
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment were talking about privileges and immunities of
distinct types of citizenship, then habeas probably should not appear on both lists. The fact that
it does suggests that Justice Miller erred.
154. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 115 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 117 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
156. Justice Swayne stated that the “citizen of a State has the same fundamental rights as a
citizen of the United States, and also certain others . . . arising from his relation to the
State . . . .” Id. at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting). He then remarked that there “may thus be a
double citizenship, each having some rights peculiar to itself.” Id. (Swayne, J., dissenting). Both
statements cannot be true. If state citizenship carries all the rights of national citizenship, then
the proposition in the second sentence—that there might be some rights of national citizenship
that are not rights of state citizenship—cannot be true.
157. Id. at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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remained in the latter category.158 Even after the Slaughter-House
mischief became a fully realized obstacle to incorporation, however,
the PI Clause’s relationship to the habeas privilege survived intact.
Three years after Slaughter-House, in United States v. Cruikshank,
the Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between citizenship
types: “The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the
United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship
under one of these governments will be different from those he has
under the other.”159 Following Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, the
Court declined a slew of opportunities to use the PI Clause to
incorporate features of the Bill against the states.160 The Supreme
Court gestured towards the PI Clause’s role in incorporating rights of
national citizenship but refused to include various express
constitutional guarantees in that category. (I address the role of the
DP Clause in incorporation mechanics in Section III.C0)
Amongst those who envisioned a more robust role for the PI
Clause—call them Slaughter-House contrarians161—the habeas
privilege also remained central. In Ex parte Spies (also known as The
Anarchists’ Case),162 well-known attorney and politician John
Randolph Tucker made a celebrated argument in favor of
incorporation under the PI Clause.163 In that case, he argued that
rights preexisting the Constitution (1) became privileges and
immunities of citizens by enumeration in the original Constitution or
the Bill, and (2) ran against the states by operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.164 Included in the list of the declared privileges,
according to Tucker, was the “security for habeas corpus.”165 A half
decade later, Justice Field expressly relied on Tucker’s reasoning

158. See id. at 74.
159. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875).
160. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96–99 (1908) (Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602–05 (1900) (Fifth Amendment
right to criminal prosecution under indictment and Sixth Amendment right to criminal trial by
jury); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448–49 (1890) (Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual
punishment” clause); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1886) (Second Amendment right
to bear arms); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 90 (1875) (Seventh Amendment jury-trial right in
civil cases).
161. This is a nod to Professor Akhil Amar, who coined the term “Barron contrarians” to
describe those who thought that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), and that the Bill applied to the states of its own force. Amar, supra note
35, at 1203.
162. The Anarchists’ Case, 123 U.S. 131, 151 (1887) (citing the oral argument).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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when he dissented in O’Neil v. Vermont,166 the case in which the Court
formally considered whether the PI Clause incorporated parts of the
Bill.167 Justice Field’s O’Neil dissent, in turn, became a staple of
Slaughter-House contrarianism.168 Justice Harlan, who had joined
Justice Field in O’Neil, continued to champion incorporation under the
PI Clause. He dissented in Maxwell v. Dow,169 a case in which the
Court refused to apply grand and petit jury guarantees against the
states, and in Twining v. New Jersey,170 a case in which the Court
refused to incorporate the Fifth Amendment rule against selfincrimination. The Twining majority expressly associated Justice
Harlan’s PI Clause position with that offered in Justice Field’s O’Neil
dissent.
The most famous Slaughter-House contrarian is Justice Hugo
Black. His Adamson v. California dissent remains the contrarians’
pièce de résistance.171 Justice Black’s objective was twofold: (1) to
establish that the Fourteenth Amendment framers intended the PI
Clause as a vehicle of incorporation, and (2) to undermine the
discretion that the Justices enjoyed under the ascendant DP Clause
incorporation paradigm.172 Having accepted that the DP Clause would
be the vehicle declaring the pertinent rights, Justice Black sought to
cabin judicial discretion by reference to limits native to the PI Clause.
Justice Black’s preferred incorporation method is sometimes
called “mechanical,” to signify that it applies only the Bill, in its
entirety,173 to the states. The label is misleading in at least one
respect: for Justice Black, the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship encompassed a little more than the rights enumerated in
the Bill. He concurred with a Justice Douglas dissent arguing that the
PI Clause covered interstate travel, seemingly on the ground that it

166. 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting) (“I think the definition given at one time before this
court by [Tucker] is correct, that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
are such as have their recognition in or guaranty from the constitution of the United States.”
(citing The Anarchists’ Case, 123 U.S. at 150)).
168. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98 (citing O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
169. 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900).
170. Twining, 211 U.S. at 114.
171. 332 U.S. 46, 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
172. See HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 23–42 (1968).
173. Technically, Justice Black only believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was capable
of incorporating the first eight Amendments, as the Ninth and Tenth could not be the logical
operand of an incorporation function. Amar, supra note 35, at 1227.
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was one of the rights specified in Slaughter-House.174 Justice Black’s
later opinions indicate that he thought the PI Clause encompassed the
rights enumerated in the Bill and the rights specified in SlaughterHouse, but not the natural rights in the Corfield inventory.175 That
information is significant because the habeas privilege was an
enumerated right that Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion
brought within the scope of the PI Clause. To the extent that Justice
Black was concerned with limiting judicial discretion, the idea that
the PI Clause included the habeas privilege would have been
unproblematic because the privilege was enumerated in the
Constitution.
Justice Thomas is the leading Slaughter-House contrarian on
the modern Supreme Court. In what could turn out to be an important
footnote to his PI Clause concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Second Amendment incorporation case,176 he wrote:
I see no reason to assume that the constitutionally enumerated rights protected by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should consist of all the rights recognized in the Bill of
Rights and no others. Constitutional provisions outside the Bill of Rights protect
individual rights, see, e.g., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (granting the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus”), and there is no obvious evidence that the Framers of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause meant to exclude them.177

So Justice Thomas believes that the PI Clause refers to, among other
things, the habeas privilege. Guessing what Justice Thomas thinks
such incorporation entails is not easy, however, in part because he
mischaracterizes the Suspension Clause as “granting” the privilege.178
I will discuss the declared privilege’s scope in Part IV, but first I want
to address a superficially similar account, based on the DP Clause, in
which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a federal habeas forum
to state prisoners.

174. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 168–80 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.”).
175. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 261 n.41
(1982) (“[Justice Black’s] later opinions suggest that, apart from the Bill of Rights guarantees, he
would have included only the rights relating directly to the Slaughter-House view of privileges
and immunities—that is, rights that owe their existence to the federal government, federal
constitution, or federal laws.”).
176. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 (2010).
177. Id. at 3084 n.20 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
178. As explained in Part II.A, the Suspension Clause doesn’t “grant” anything; it
announces restrictions on a suspension power. The power to suspend and the privilege on which
it operates originate from somewhere other than the Suspension Clause itself. I strongly suspect
that somewhere in the details lies a dispute with Justice Thomas over what I believe the
constitutional privilege entails, but not with the fact that the PI Clause covers it.
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C. Incorporating the Privilege Under the DP Clause
Before reaching the status of a state-prisoner privilege under
the PI Clause, it is worth asking whether an account based on the DP
Clause and using traditional incorporation mechanics could get to the
same place. It can’t. Professor Jordan Steiker has developed the best
version of the DP Clause account.179 Pursuant to selective
incorporation, the DP Clause incorporates “fundamental” rights
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and deeply rooted in our
nation’s history and traditions.180 On Professor Steiker’s account, the
DP Clause guaranteed a federal habeas forum to state prisoners
because, by 1868, that privilege met the selective-incorporation
criteria.181 Professor Steiker relies heavily on Professor Akhil Amar’s
theory of “refined incorporation.”182 According to Professor Amar,
individual rights behave differently depending on whether they
restrain the federal government (as specified in the original
Constitution or the Bill) or whether they restrain the states (as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment).183
Professor Steiker’s account differs markedly from mine, most
notably because he rejects the possibility that contact with the PI
Clause could be the source of a federal privilege to challenge state
custody.184 A DP Clause account has other complications, however: it
requires an argument that a state-prisoner privilege was historically

179. See Steiker, supra note 4, at 899 (“In light of the Court’s ‘incorporation’ decisions, the
courts should recognize the privilege of habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause as a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right.”). Professor Michael O’Connor wrote an article
arguing that the PI Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal forum when they are incarcerated
on account of race. See O’Connor, supra note 71, at 666 (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause
was intended to constitutionalize federal habeas corpus review of any state attempts to deprive
an individual of liberty based upon race.”). Professor O’Connor is more comfortable relying on PI
Clause contact than is Professor Steiker, but on his account, the privilege translates ultimately
only into a limited constitutional guarantee against racially biased custody. O’Connor, supra
note 71, at 660. That limit is premised on a flawed reading of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act’s
legislative history. Compare O’Connor, supra note 71, at 686–87 (“While the language of the act
would change, its purpose to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the
constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, would remain unchanged.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), with supra Part IV.B.4. Moreover, Professor O’Connor does not explain why PI
Clause contact would restrict federal action, and he relies on traditional incorporation
mechanics. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 718–19.
180. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quotations omitted).
181. Steiker, supra note 4, at 869–70.
182. Id. at 869.
183. Amar, supra note 35, at 1264–66.
184. Professor Steiker occasionally invokes the text of the PI Clause as supporting the spirit
of Due Process incorporation, but he believes that the PI Clause cannot do the work. Steiker,
supra note 4, at 869.
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fundamental, and it struggles to show how the Fourteenth
Amendment produced a restriction on the federal government. An
account of the same privilege based on the PI Clause avoids these
issues.
1. A Note on Terminology: The Incorporated Object
Too much is made of incorporating the Suspension Clause.
Professor Steiker’s titular question is whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Suspension Clause,185 but the
incorporated phenomenon is the habeas privilege. The Suspension
Clause references that privilege, but the Suspension Clause itself is
nothing more than a limit on suspension power. Habeas power was an
incident of the habeas privilege, which is defined largely by
corresponding judicial power over categories of custodians.186 If
“creation” of the privilege must be attributed to any string of
constitutional text, then the strongest candidate is Article III, not the
Suspension Clause.187 And if Article III secures a constitutionally
guaranteed habeas privilege, then the more generally applicable
principle that Congress can electively vest Article III judicial power
does not apply to habeas jurisdiction.188
Also, Framers of the original Constitution were legal
naturalists: they believed that rights preexisted acts of textual
declaration.189 When people write about incorporating something that
the Suspension Clause “created,” they are reading the original
Constitution—a document written by legal naturalists—through
positivist lenses. Analyzing Fourteenth Amendment contact with the
Suspension Clause, rather than Fourteenth Amendment contact with
the habeas privilege that the Suspension Clause recognizes, produces
answers to the wrong questions. No function that the Suspension
Clause actually performs is involved in an account of what happens
when processing the privilege through the PI Clause.
The mistaken attribution is more than a semantic issue. If the
corollary of the habeas privilege is Article III judicial power, then the
implications of guaranteeing the privilege to a new category of

185. Id. at 862.
186. See supra Part II.A (introducing the habeas privilege)
187. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 754, 774–78.
188. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power To Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
45, 46–47 (1975) (stating the general rule).
189. See generally AMAR, supra note 95, at 147–56 (describing how declaratory theory
influenced the development of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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prisoners change. Habeas Power explained that a prisoner’s habeas
privilege corresponds to federal habeas power, the vesting of which is
mandatory, over that prisoner’s custodian.190 If the Constitution
guarantees a habeas privilege reaching state custodians, then that
privilege necessarily means that Congress cannot strip the
corresponding judicial power to discharge state prisoners.
2. The Vehicle of Incorporation
An account based on the DP Clause suffers from some of the
more general problems afflicting selective incorporation: the absence
of Framers’ intent,191 no textual anchor,192 adherence to an open-ended
incorporation methodology,193 and the subjectivity involved in
declaring a “privilege” sufficiently fundamental to qualify for due
process enforcement at all.194 That ground is well traversed, and I will
not cross it much here.
Recall specifically the test for an incorporated right: whether it
is a necessary feature of “ordered liberty,” and whether it is
“fundamental” because it is a “principle of justice [deeply] rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people”195 Although the AngloAmerican role of the habeas writ is difficult to overstate, the privilege
did not manifest in general federal power to review state custody for
the first eight decades of American history. That state of affairs
creates different problems depending on one’s preferred approach to
constitutional interpretation. If one is an originalist who measures
from 1868 the extent to which a right is fundamental, then defenders
of a DP Clause theory must establish that American tradition
encompassed a broad right to contest state custody even though

190. See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 774–78 (discussing a conceptualization of the habeas
privilege as a corollary of Article III judicial power).
191. See Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J.
74, 77–78 (1982) (“There is no evidence, and it is difficult to conceive, that anyone thought or
intended that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation. In the
absence of any special intention revealed in the history of the amendment, we have only the
language to look to.”).
192. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1526 (2000) (calling the theory of selective incorporation
“textually untenable”).
193. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION 161 (1994).
194. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I
Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1560 (1996) (“While fundamental
fairness nominally incorporates most of the procedures set out in the Bill of Rights, the Court
has qualified those procedures according to ad hoc balances of competing interests.”).
195. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quotation marks omitted).
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Congress did not provide for it until 1867.196 Or, if one is not an
originalist and believes that Justices can rank a right as fundamental
even if it was not so viewed in 1868, then the argument slips back into
the most severe problems associated with the absence of authoritative
legal sourcing.
3. State Action and Incorporation
The most significant problem with traditional incorporation—
irrespective of the vehicle—is that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is a prohibition on state action: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
Citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”197 The
problem with an account in which the DP Clause incorporates the
habeas privilege is its attempt to support a constitutional restriction
on the federal government. This problem is probably the reason why
Professor Steiker refers to incorporation as the “more circuitous” route
to a privilege with Type 2 features.198
Recall our diagram from Part II.B. Figure 2 presents a slightly
modified diagram of habeas privilege configurations. Any Fourteenth
Amendment account should be assessed by how effectively it justifies
adding Type 2 privilege features to the preexisting Type 1 guarantee.
Figure 2: Fourteenth Amendment Accounts
Federal Custody
Federal
Privilege

State
Privilege

State Custody

(1) federal privilege to
contest federal custody
(original Constitution)

(2) federal privilege to contest
state custody
(Kovarsky: PI Clause; Steiker:
DP Clause)

(3) state privilege to contest
federal custody

(4) state privilege to contest
state custody

196. The earlier provisions creating habeas power to relieve state custody were very limited.
The 1833 Force Act created a habeas remedy for federal officials in state custody for performing
official duties, and the 1842 Force Act created a remedy for foreign-state representatives acting
in their official capacities. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842); Habeas
Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634 (1833).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
198. Steiker, supra note 4, at 867.
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As Section IV.B will explain, the proposition that Fourteenth
Amendment contact results in a state habeas privilege is implausible
in light of the intent and structure of the Reconstruction
Amendments.199
Traditional incorporation mechanics do not adequately explain
how the Fourteenth Amendment added Type 2 features to the
preexisting habeas guarantee. If the Fourteenth Amendment truly
incorporates the habeas privilege against the states, then either “no
state shall make or enforce any law” abridging it (the PI Clause
version), or a state unconstitutionally takes “life, liberty, or property”
by violating it (the DP Clause version). In either formulation, a habeas
privilege processed using traditional incorporation mechanics
generates hiccups: privileges with Type 3 and 4 features. The existing
DP Clause incorporation model is at its weakest in explaining how it
avoids that implausible result.
The DP Clause account basically relies on structure and
purpose to dominate a textually expressed limit on state action.200
Professor Amar’s theory of refined incorporation provides a deeply
satisfying account of how individual rights might change when they
are incorporated against the states, but it does not alter the way we
understand the words “no State shall . . . abridge” and “nor shall any
State . . . deny.”201 For the federal habeas privilege, even the best DP
Clause incorporation account still struggles against the Clause’s text.
D. The Habeas Privilege Consensus
Now consider what I call the declarative function of the PI
Clause. Combining the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with content of the first yields a federal privilege to
contest state custody that is consistent with both the PI Clause’s text
and the more general structure and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1’s first two sentences together declare national
citizenship and the bundle of rights it entails. By definition, the
federal government may not abridge that newly declared bundle of
rights. Under my account, there is simply no need to develop a
199. Professor Steiker realized this problem. See id. at 894 (“The difficulty in reconstructing
the privilege of habeas corpus in this way is that it runs contrary to the Reconstruction
Congress’s apparent belief that recourse to the state courts would not adequately ensure
enforcement of the newly established rights.”).
200. See id. at 899 (“On the other hand, though, the text does not support, and in fact
undermines, the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a right to federal habeas
corpus. Accordingly, the case for constitutionalizing such federal review must be based on other
considerations.”).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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complex theory explaining why the absence of a federal habeas forum
constitutes state abridgment (PI Clause) or deprivation (DP Clause).
The PI Clause inspires many interpretive disagreements,
including the meaning of “privileges” and “immunities,” as well as the
extent to which state action is restricted. One of the few Fourteenth
Amendment propositions that should provoke no interpretive
resistance, however, is that the PI Clause declares the habeas
privilege to be a right of national citizenship.202 That conclusion is
perhaps most easily drawn for textualists—habeas is the only
entitlement denominated as a privilege in the Articles of Constitution
or the Bill. The proposition also works well in an originalist idiom,
whether focused on intent or understanding. Perhaps most
importantly, the proposition’s acceptability does not differ depending
on whether one is a Slaughter-House enthusiast or contrarian. As I
explained in my introduction to Part III, my account does not require
readers to declare allegiances in pitched battles over interpretive
methods.
IV. A PRIVILEGE OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP TO CHALLENGE
STATE CUSTODY
In Part IV, I work from a premise established in Part III:
virtually all authority recognizes that the PI Clause does something to
the habeas privilege. But what does it do? What features of the habeas
privilege does the PI Clause constitutionalize? The best interpretation
is that the PI Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas
forum, thereby adding Type 2 features to the original constitutional
guarantee. Congress submitted Fourteenth Amendment at the same
time as it enacted the nation’s most important change in habeas
privilege: the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The Act extended the
federal privilege to reach state custody. The PI Clause declared that
version of the habeas guarantee to be an incident of national
citizenship. If habeas power over state custodians is constitutionally
inviolable, then federal courts must revisit basic questions about the
modern structure of postconviction review for state prisoners.
In Part IV, I want to distinguish two concepts that observers
frequently conflate. In short, the first-order issue of whether habeas
power reaches state custody is distinct from the second-order issue of
whether such power permits federal review of a state criminal

202. In his seminal work on the Bill and incorporation, Professor Amar repeatedly identifies
the privilege as a Fourteenth Amendment referent. AMAR, supra note 95, at 175, 179, 211, 219,
227, 297.
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conviction. In state-prisoner cases, those questions often appear in
tandem, because criminal convictions are the primary (but not
exclusive) form of custody exercised by states.203 Sections IV.A and
IV.B focus on the state-custody question. Section IV.C reaches some
preliminary conclusions about the postconviction question, but the
habeas privilege belonging to criminally confined state prisoners
deserves comprehensive treatment in another Article.
A. Rejecting the State-Privilege Products
Before analyzing the federal privilege that the PI Clause
secures, I want to deal briefly with the state-privilege possibilities.
Whatever power corresponds to an expanded privilege, that power is
federal. The PI Clause, that is, does not entitle prisoners to a state
habeas forum. Consider once again our familiar matrix, slightly
modified to preview the content of this Part:
Figure 3: New Features of Privilege
Federal Custody

State Custody

Federal
Privilege

(1) federal privilege for
federal custody (disqualified
under Section IV.B.1)

(2) federal privilege for state
custody (created by PI Clause
contact, Sections IV.B.2 to
IV.B.5)

State
Privilege

(3) state privilege for federal
custody (disqualified under
Section IV.A.1)

(4) state privilege for state
custody (disqualified under
Section IV.A.2)

Here, I argue that the PI Clause added Type 2 features to the
original Constitution’s Type 1 guarantee. First, though, I devote Part
IV.A to the implausibility of accounts in which the Civil War
amendments produced a constitutional guarantee for Privilege Types
3 and 4, both of which involve state judicial power. The PI Clause did
not transform the federal habeas guarantee into a state privilege any
more than the DP Clause converted the First Amendment into a state
right.

203. For example, habeas process is used to review civil custody such as pretrial detention,
mental health commitment, quarantines, and restrictions on sexual predators. See, e.g., Seling v.
Young, 531 U.S. 250, 253–56 (2001) (reviewing Washington state statute for civilly committing
“sexually violent predators”).
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1. A Type 3 State Privilege for Federal Prisoners
This one is easy. If Reconstruction was designed to force the
rebellious states to swallow federal supremacy as the price of
restoration, then the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower state
judges to void federal custody. In Tarble’s Case,204 moreover, the
Supreme Court held that a Type 3 privilege was unconstitutional. In
fact, even if Tarble had broken the other way, the Fourteenth
Amendment would not have been the reason. The argument in favor of
a Type 3 privilege is predicated on the intent of the 1789 Framers and
common practice during the early years of the republic—not some
subsequent constitutional event.205 Thus, contact with the PI Clause
did not guarantee a state forum to contest federal custody.
2. A Type 4 State Privilege for State Prisoners
Privilege Type 4 is slightly more difficult to dismiss. A
PI Clause–created state privilege to contest state custody is a more
plausible outcome than is a PI Clause–created state privilege to
challenge federal custody. No less a figure than Professor William
Crosskey, the earliest academic ally of Justice Black, appears to have
taken this view.206 Its pedigree notwithstanding,207 the proposition
breaks down under the microscope.
First, in the abstract, there was no need to secure a state
habeas privilege. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,

204. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
205. See supra note 52 (collecting authority explaining argument that the constitution did
permit state habeas review of federal custody). This argument has been accomplished by reading
Tarble’s Case as setting forth a rule of federal preemption rather than a rule of categorical
prohibition. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 43, at 64 n.17 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 437–39 (6th ed. 2009))
(arguing that reading Tarble’s Case as a broad constitutional rule about exclusive federal
jurisdiction over the writ of habeas corpus, rather than only as a statutory preemption rule
precluding states from granting the writ to a petitioner in federal custody, would “run afoul of
basic concepts of the role of the state courts in enforcing federal, and especially constitutional,
rights”); see also Amar, supra note 43, at 1510 (contending that Booth and Tarble should be read
as “attributing to Congress a desire for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings
against federal officers”).
206. See CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1129 (reading Fourteenth Amendment contact to
show that “the guaranty against suspension [of the writ is] now operative against the states in
their own courts”).
207. Professor Amar also seemed to endorse this understanding. See Amar, supra note 35, at
1258 (citing CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1128–30) (stating that Justice Miller, in his
Slaughter-House opinion, “had in mind only state interference with efforts to assemble and
petition the federal government, and to secure habeas relief on the basis of federal laws in federal
courts”).
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almost every state already guaranteed one, in some form or another.208
In 1787, four of the twelve states with written constitutions provided
habeas guarantees.209 True, some early state constitutions omitted
habeas language, but that was only because nobody questioned that
citizens had a state privilege.210
By the Civil War, formal state commitment to habeas
privileges was even more pronounced. Except for Vermont, every state
admitted to the Union since 1787 had a written constitutional
provision resembling the federal Suspension Clause.211 Vermont had a
habeas provision, but it provided that the privilege should never be
suspended.212 Furthermore, six of the nine original states that lacked
written habeas guarantees eventually enacted state constitutional
provisions providing them.213
The states prolifically used the common-law writ,214 so
legislation was unnecessary.215 Using state habeas statutes to
supplement common-law process was old hat; such was the
relationship between the English common-law writ and the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679.216 The state privilege was largely useless to slaves
and abolitionists before the Civil War—and to freedmen and southern
208. See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243,
249 (1965) (“All twenty-one of the new states admitted after 1787 and prior to 1860, with the sole
exception of Vermont, wrote into their constitutions a habeas corpus provision practically (and in
most cases exactly) identical to the federal provision.”).
209. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX; MASS. CONST. ch. 6, art. VII (1780); N.C. CONST. of 1776,
art XII; N.H. CONST. (unnumbered provision) (1784).
210. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32
B.U. L. REV. 143, 146 (1952)
211. ALA. CONST. art I, § 17 (1819); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art II, § 18; CAL. CONST. of 1849,
art I, § 5; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 13; IND. CONST. of
1816, art. I, § 14; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 8; KY. CONST. of
1792, art. XII, § 16; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. 6, § 19; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1820); MICH. CONST.
of 1835, art. I, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1857); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 17; MO.
CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 11; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 12; OR. CONST. art. I, § 23
(1857); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 15; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 8 (1848).
212. VT. CONST. art. XII (1836).
213. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 14; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 13; GA. CONST. of 1798,
art. IV, § 9; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 11; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 6; PA. CONST. of
1790, art. IX, § 14; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 9. In other words, when the Civil War started,
only Maryland and South Carolina lacked express constitutional habeas provisions. And both of
those states added habeas provisions to their constitutions as the Fourteenth Amendment was
being ratified. Md. CONST. art. III, § 55 (1867); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 17.
214. See Oaks, supra note 208, at 287–88 (“[T]he availability of the writ [of habeas corpus]
for many types of restraints—differing from state to state—remained under the authority of the
common law.”).
215. State habeas statutes were not prevalent until well into nineteenth century. See id. at
251–52.
216. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
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loyalists after it—but the Equal Protection Clause was the Fourteenth
Amendment text addressed to that problem.217
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners
have no constitutional right to postconviction review in state court.218
Of course, state postconviction review is not synonymous with state
habeas review, but if that distinction were important, one might
expect it to register in at least some federal opinions. I have been
unable to locate a single one.
Third, conceptualizing the federal enforcement mechanism for
a state privilege is a challenge. If a state unconstitutionally restricted
habeas relief in a particular case, then the prisoner would need federal
enforcement. Relying exclusively on the appellate review in the
Supreme Court is a dubious enforcement model.219 Using lower federal
courts to enforce a Type 4 privilege, on the other hand, would be a tad
ironic. The state custody would become unlawful only after the state
violated the Type 4 privilege, at which point a federal enforcement
action would ripen. The vehicle for such à la carte review of state
custody is . . . a federal habeas proceeding. Naturally, constructing a
Type 4 privilege to avoid federal habeas process makes little sense if
the only plausible way of enforcing the privilege necessarily entails
that very same process.220
B. The Type 2 Federal Privilege for Federal Prisoners
The case for interpreting the PI Clause to guarantee a Type 2
privilege is a lot stronger than the accounts necessary to support other
outcomes. The Fourteenth Amendment and the 1867 Habeas Corpus
Act were both outputs of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, in which
Republican membership was struggling internally with a consensus
approach to Reconstruction and was at loggerheads with President
217. For an explanation of the relationship between a habeas privilege and sovereign
protection, see infra Part IV.B.5.
218. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 488 (1969)) (“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when
mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . .”).
219. Its direct review of the custody determination necessarily precedes any state collateral
adjudication, so there would always need to be an additional round of review to adjudicate the
collateral restriction. Supreme Court review of state collateral determinations is technically
feasible, but the idea of the Supreme Court reviewing all state custody is unappealing and, to say
the least, unlikely to be what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in mind.
220. Of course, if Congress stripped the federal habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, then this version of the incorporated habeas privilege would just be a right without a
remedy. I am not arguing that every constitutional right requires a judicial remedy, but I am
making a more atmospheric point: the adopted vehicle would, ironically, place more pressure on
the vehicle nominally avoided.
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Andrew Johnson.221 Republicans had used the Fourteenth
Amendment’s promise to secure their seats on one end of
Pennsylvania Avenue and were about to try to evict the occupant
living at the other.222 When Congress submitted the Fourteenth
Amendment for state consideration, almost all of the Southern
governments rejected it on the first go-around, and there was real
doubt as to whether they would approve it on a second.223 The
Reconstruction Acts were therefore designed to kneecap the wayward
Southern governments and to promote replacements more receptive
to, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment.224 With much of
their proposed legislation left vulnerable amidst the rift with
President Johnson and with the uncertain status of restoration,225
Congressional Republicans were simply trying two different ways to
skin the cat: they were expanding the habeas privilege through both
veto-proof legislation and a constitutional amendment.226
Congressional Republicans wanted an amendment redundant
of statutory habeas principles for the same reasons they wanted an
amendment redundant of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: because the
Fourteenth Amendment would make the statutory principles immune
both from adverse judicial review and from legislative reversal when
rebellious states were restored.227 Habeas legislation and the
Amendment were ultimately successful, so the 1867 Habeas Corpus
Act was as much a definition of the privilege specified in the

221. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 162–68; Raoul Berger, Activist Indifference to Facts, 61
TENN. L. REV. 9, 27 (1993).
222. For a succinct account of the impeachment of President Johnson, see Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., Reflections on Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 696 (1999).
223. Florida, Georgia, and Texas rejected the Amendment before the beginning of the second
session. BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 212. The rest of the rebellious states soon followed,
prompting congressional Republicans to rethink how the conditions for restoration would relate
to the Amendment. See id. at 212–17 (explaining the internal debates between radical and
conservative Republicans on how to proceed). For a substantial book on Fourteenth Amendment
consideration in the former confederacy, see BOND, supra note 85.
224. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453,
500–01, 505–06 (1989).
225. Although the House had not yet impeached him, President Johnson had vetoed two
signature pieces of the 1866 Reconstruction legislation: the Civil Rights Act and the Freedman’s
Bureau Bill. See ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 287–90, 314–15
(1960).
226. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 169 (explaining how the Reconstruction Committee
“accepted as its basis of action” that it would incorporate “into one constitutional amendment
nearly all the elements of the centrist program”).
227. For a discussion of the relationship between the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 77, 128, 225.
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Amendment as an effectuation of it.228 That privilege entitled state
prisoners to a federal habeas forum.
1. Rejecting the Redundant Type 1 Interpretation
If the PI Clause protects some habeas privilege, then might it
be one with Type 1 features: a federal privilege to test federal custody?
Unlikely. Positioning Type 1 features as a product of the PI Clause
would mean that the PI Clause changed nothing about the guarantee
whatsoever—an outcome inconsistent with the Part III’s basic
premise.229 All available information indicates that the PI Clause
changed at least something about the habeas guarantee.
The Fourteenth Amendment did bar states from abridging the
privilege, but under the Supremacy Clause,230 states could not abridge
a Type 1 privilege under the original Constitution anyway.231
Professor Crosskey recognized this problem and believed (incorrectly,
by my lights) that Fourteenth Amendment contact guaranteed some
state habeas privilege.232 Interpreting the PI Clause to guarantee
nothing more than a federal habeas forum to federal prisoners is
redundant enough to disqualify the outcome from the potential
solution set.
2. Declaring a Habeas Privilege, Circa 1868
Because the PI Clause performs the “declarative function,”233
someone constructing the Clause’s effect on the habeas privilege would
be more interested in the scope of the privilege in 1868 than in 1789.
Albeit far from a consensus, more and more scholars are endorsing
Reconstruction, not the Constitutional Convention, as the historical
228. For this reason, the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act was not an anticipatory exercise of
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but legislatively defined the
scope of the privilege the PI Clause requires.
229. Even if the Articles of Constitution did not guarantee a federal privilege to contest
federal custody, an outcome with Type 1 features would still result in no change in the existing
relationship.
230. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
231. See Amar, supra note 35, at 1258–59:
Miller had in mind only state interference with efforts to assemble and petition the
federal government, and to secure habeas relief on the basis of federal laws in federal
courts . . . . Clearly the supremacy clause standing alone, or as glossed by [McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)], would have sufficed to prohibit state
interference with federal petitions and federal writs.
232. See CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1129. I reject the state-privilege outcomes for the
reasons set forth in supra Part IV.A.
233. See supra Part III.D (explaining that the PI Clause declares the habeas privilege to be
a right of national citizenship).
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starting point for interpreting and constructing phenomena touched
by the Fourteenth Amendment.234 The case for this paradigm shift is
strongest when the phenomenon at issue—such as the habeas
privilege—touches on the basic relationship between federal courts
and the states. Even the Slaughter-House majority expressed the view
that the “privileges or immunities” referenced in the PI Clause
required it to look to the features of the pertinent rights during
Reconstruction.235 People with certain interpretive commitments—
that the only data pertinent to constitutional interpretation and
construction is from 1789—will have no truck with my account.236 But
I want to convince everyone else.
When construing the PI Clause, we tend to focus on only the
opening words in the second sentence: “No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States . . . .”237 The second sentence of Section 1 is a selfcontained expression of what I call the “anti-abridgment” function, a
limitation on state action. In combination with the first sentence,
which provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of the United States, the second sentence also
performs a subtle declarative function. The PI Clause declares not
only that there are privileges and immunities of national citizenship,
but also the fact of national citizenship itself. That particular
declaration was extremely significant.

234. Professor Kurt Lash, for example, has written three articles on what one might call
“privileges or immunities originalism.” See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or
Immunities Cause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101
GEO. L.J. 1275, 1281 (2013) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part III] (arguing that popular rejections
of Johnson’s “alternative” amendment replacing the PI Clause with the language of the Comity
Clause shows that the set of privileges and immunities contemplated by the PI Clause was more
expansive than the set contemplated by the Comity Clause); Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note
102, at 337 (arguing that a first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting common-law
rights was rejected in favor of the final draft that left common-law rights to the states); Kurt T.
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Cause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as
an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1243–44 (2010) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part I]
(arguing that the term “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” was an
Antebellum term of art with meaning separate from state-conferred privileges and immunities).
235. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872) (explaining the need to
look to privileges established by Reconstruction Amendments).
236. Those judges and scholars more popularly coded originalist might disclaim reliance on
the status of the right after Fourteenth Amendment ratification, opting instead to assess the
scope of the right under the native constitutional provision. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth
Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 1012 (2012) (arguing that scholars who attempt to
understand constitutional rights through the lens of Reconstruction are not usually categorized
as “originalists”).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Before the Civil War and Reconstruction, state citizenship was
the atomic unit of political membership;238 the existence of national
citizenship was in doubt.239 By implication, the rights attached to
national citizenship status were also unclear. The Civil War created a
national state, and Reconstruction—largely through Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment—made national citizenship concrete.240 In
Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney had bottomed the holding that African
Americans could not invoke federal diversity jurisdiction on the theory
that, whatever the status of their state citizenship, they were not
citizens of the United States.241 He then characterized the right to go
to federal court as a “privilege” of citizens.242 House Republican John
Bingham, Senator Jacob Howard, and other pivotal members of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress made the connection between Dred Scott and
the Fourteenth Amendment explicit; they sought, among other things,
to declare national citizenship.243 In a less contentious portion of
Slaughter-House, Justice Miller recognized the declarative function of
the PI Clause, vis-à-vis Dred Scott:
[Section 1] opens with a definition of citizenship . . . of the States. No such definition
was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by
act of Congress. . . . It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the
United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the
Union. . . . Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided.
But . . . [the Court held, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)], only a few years
before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent . . . was not and could

238. See Lash, Origins, Part I, supra note 234, at 1259, 1282–83 (illustrating that, under
antebellum law, Article IV was interpreted to indicate that the “privileges and immunities”
conferred by the Constitution were separate from privileges and immunities (rights) conferred by
state law).
239. See Lash, Origins, Part III, supra note 234, at 1293 (explaining that Johnson’s veto of
the Civil Rights Bill indicated that he believed “Congress lacked constitutional authority to
confer the status of national citizenship”); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 335 (2006) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause caused a “fundamental transformation of nationhood”).
240. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
277 (1988) (“[T]he Civil War created a national state and Reconstruction added the idea of a
national citizenry whose common rights no state could abridge . . . .”).
241. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1856) (“It does not by any means follow,
because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the
United States.”).
242. Id. at 403.
243. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“[I]t
was intended by the framers of the Constitution that the day should Come when the words ‘free
person’ in the Constitution would cease to be operative, for the simple reason that all would be
free and none bond in the United States.”); id. at 2765 (statement of Senator Howard) (arguing
on behalf of the Senate drafting committee of the Fourteenth Amendment for the inclusion of the
Citizenship Clause); id. at 3032 (statement of Senator Henderson) (“The Federal Constitution
failed to define United States citizenship and equally failed to declare what classes of persons
should be entitled to its privileges.”).
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not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision . . . was to be accepted as
a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship . . . . To remove this difficulty
primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which
should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also
citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed.244

If the urgent declarative function of the PI Clause was to
declare the fact and content of national citizenship,245 then the urgent
anti-abridgment function involved the states. There was no analogous
urgency with respect to restrictions on the federal government because
limits on federal action inhered in the declaration of privileges and
immunities incident to national citizenship. If the habeas privilege is a
privilege of national citizenship, then the federal government cannot
abridge the privilege any more than the states can.
3. The Interpretive Significance of Pre-1867 Habeas Law
By 1868, lawmakers had been primed to accept the reality of
expanded privilege scope. Even before the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
(discussed in detail below), the federal privilege had grown beyond the
metes and bounds originally set by the Judiciary Act of 1789.246
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the courts and
Congress put to rest the idea that the privilege could not reach
custody of state sovereigns. Habeas power could operate in personam
on state jailors, just like anybody else.
Congress enacted two antebellum privilege expansions vesting
federal judges with habeas power to discharge state prisoners. Neither
was a generalized habeas power over state detention; each targeted a
particular form of state custody. When South Carolina flirted with
nullification,247 Congress passed the pejoratively titled Force Act of
244. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72–73 (1872). At least insofar as
Justice Miller positions the PI Clause as a response to Dred Scott and as a means of declaring
the fact of national citizenship, he is almost certainly correct. See Crosskey, supra note 135, at 4–
5 (“[T]he purposes of the initial provision of the amendment defining state and national
citizenship seem perfectly clear: the foregoing doctrine of the Dred Scott Case was to be
nullified . . . .”).
245. See Ackerman, supra note 224, at 509–10 (describing one of the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment as defining national citizenship and reversing Dred Scott); James E.
Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1925, 1958 (2004):
The switch to a focus on the rights of national citizenship corresponded to an
emphasis on national citizenship in the opening sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its declaration that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of both the United States and the state in which they reside.
246. See Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
247. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS,
AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 75–76 (1987) (describing the drafting of the Ordinance of
Nullification that would declare the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void in South Carolina).
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1833, which basically extended the privilege to federal officials taken
into state custody for doing their jobs.248 In 1842, Congress again
extended the habeas privilege, targeting state custody exercised over
foreign nationals acting on official behalf of their home countries.249
Neither statute embodied a general habeas power to review
state custody, but the 1833 and 1842 Acts established that the habeas
privilege could rely on federal judicial power to discharge prisoners
from state custody.250 To be sure, those laws were expressing
congressional powers rather than fulfilling constitutional obligations;
but they reflect a gradual change in how the privilege helped
distribute power between federal and state governments. So, when the
Thirty-Ninth Congress went about its work, the country was primed to
accept a state-prisoner privilege as an incident of national citizenship.
4. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867
The Fourteenth Amendment entitles a state prisoner to a
federal habeas forum not because the PI Clause “incorporated” the
privilege against the states but because the Clause restricted the
federal government. I have already discussed some legislative history
pertinent to Fourteenth Amendment interpretation,251 but I want to
focus on the coinciding legislative history of the 1867 Habeas Corpus
Act.252 For my purposes, the latter legislative history may provide a
248. See Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634–35:
[A] judge of any district court of the United States . . . shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners . . . where he or they shall be
committed or confined on . . . for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a
law of the United States . . . .
Federal judges later used Force Act provisions to free federal officials arrested by Northern
States for enforcing fugitive slave laws. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965 (S.D. Ohio
1856) (using the Force Act to free a federal marshal who was held in contempt and jailed by a
state court).
249. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842):
[A] judge of any district court of the United States . . . shall have power to grant writs
of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where
he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign state, and domiciled therein,
shall be committed or confined . . . for or on account of any act done or omitted under
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or
claimed under commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or
Sovereignty . . . .
250. See William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, 36 J. S. HIST. 530, 534–35 (1970) (explaining that, until the Force Act of 1833 and Habeas
Corpus Act of 1842 increased the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts, “federal habeas relief
was available only when the petitioner had been confined by an order of a federal court and only
before trial”).
251. See infra Part III.A (discussing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
252. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (expanding the jurisdiction of
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for state prisoners).
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window into the contemporaneous understanding of the habeas
privilege bound to national citizenship by the PI Clause.
The 1867 Act was a central feature of the Republican
Reconstruction plan because it furnished a federal remedy for state
violations of newly announced federal rights.253 Its text and legislative
history sound in the same register of federal supremacy as do the
other pieces of Reconstruction legislation—specifically, legislation
clearing the path to a federal courthouse.254 The Act moved through
exactly the same committees as did all important Thirty-Ninth
Congress work product. The prominent Republican lawmakers
populating these committees also boasted membership on the allpowerful Joint Committee on Reconstruction.255 To characterize as
coincidental recurring language in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
1867 Habeas Act, and other Reconstruction legislation—or as
ornamental textual alterations in those laws—is to ignore the basic
structure of Reconstruction lawmaking.256
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 entitled state prisoners to a
federal habeas forum, which dramatically expanded the privilege
beyond that provided under 1789 Judiciary Act.257 The Thirty-Ninth
Congress submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states on June

253. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 532, 538 (explaining that the Act changed the nature of
the writ of habeas corpus and allowed federal courts to exert their primacy in deciding questions
about individual liberties).
254. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2064 (1992) (discussing how statutory
provision for writs of error and habeas corpus, as well as for removal, clearly shows that
Congress wanted to maximize federal court review of state court decisions); see also Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal
Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793,
800–05 (1965) (representing perhaps the most comprehensive work on the centrality of federal
habeas and removal jurisdiction).
255. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 143–44 (detailing membership of Joint Committee).
256. See, e.g., Liebman supra note 254, at 2049 (underscoring intended resemblance of
Reconstruction habeas and removal legislation); Steiker, supra note 4, at 886 (“A ‘contextual’
reading of the habeas statute does not suggest a series of isolated jurisdictional developments.
Rather, these statutes reveal Congress's overall effort—through removal, writ-of-error, and
habeas jurisdiction—to enhance opportunities to adjudicate federal questions in the federal
courts.”); Wiecek, supra note 250, at 531 (drawing parallels between development of habeas and
removal jurisdiction during Reconstruction).
257. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1844) (holding that the court did not have the
authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a state prisoner). Between 1789 and 1867, the two
intervening provisions reaching state custody were quite limited. When South Carolina moved to
nullify federal tax law, Congress passed the Force Act of 1833, which created a habeas remedy
for federal officials arrested for enforcing federal law. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7,
4 Stat. 634 (1833). Responsive to a diplomatic crisis, the 1842 Force Act created a remedy for
foreign representatives acting in their official capacities. Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5
Stat. 539 (1842).
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13, 1866,258 and passed the Habeas Corpus Act on February 5, 1867. 259
When the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and it went into
effect on July 28, 1868,260 the PI Clause constitutionalized a federal
habeas privilege that reached state custody—the very privilege that
the Thirty-Ninth Congress had created the year before.
There is little legislative history on the 1867 Habeas Act, a
vacuum allowing long-standing dispute over whether the Act was
meant to authorize federal habeas review of state criminal
convictions.261 The issue of postconviction review, however, is distinct
from the more general issue of whether the Act empowered federal
judges to reach state custody generally. (I discuss the postconviction
issue in Section IV.C.) The 1867 Habeas Act’s plain text clearly
establishes a general habeas power over state jailors. One might
challenge the broad textual interpretation, however, by arguing that
Congress designed the statute with a narrower purpose in mind. The
Act was designed, the purposivist might argue, only to secure the
liberties of Southern loyalists and freedmen,262 the latter of which
were suffering under the Black Codes proliferating throughout the
South.263 In turn, the more narrow, purposivist interpretation
facilitates the conclusion that “there is no foundation for the Court’s
assertions that the 1867 act was intended to afford a new remedy for
state prisoners.”264
The narrowing interpretation requires an interpreter not only
to ignore text but also to engage in a rather strained reading of the
legislative history. Advocates of that interpretation place far too much
emphasis on an early resolution initiating the drafting process,265
258. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866).
259. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867)).
260. The last state that needed to ratify the Amendment had actually done so earlier in the
month, but July 28 is the day that Secretary of State William Seward declared the Fourteenth
Amendment effective. See Sec’y William H. Seward, U.S. Dep’t of State, Proclamation No. 13, 15
Stat. 708 (1868).
261. See supra note 73 (citing the work of two professors with opposing views on the
subject).
262. See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1113 (1995) (“Congress was specifically concerned
with freedmen, or their children, held under apprenticeship laws.”). Almost all of these
arguments build off an article on the Act’s legislative history by Professor Lewis Mayers. See
Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965).
263. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988) (noting the Republican leadership’s proposed legislation to
override codes that discriminated against former slaves).
264. Mayers, supra note 262, at 55–56.
265. See infra notes 280–94 and accompanying text (discussing the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867’s journey through Congress).
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ignore explanations for statutory word choice that are completely
consistent with the consensus understanding,266 and selectively omit
important context about pertinent statements made by legislators
after the Act passed.267
On the final day of the Thirty-Eighth Congress—March 3,
1865—President Lincoln signed a joint resolution declaring the
freedom of military families.268 The Thirteenth Amendment had not
been ratified, so the resolution was intended to reach persons not
covered by the Emancipation Proclamation.269 A few days into the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, on December 19, 1865, Representative Samuel
Shellabarger introduced a unanimously-consented-to resolution that
the [Judiciary Committee] be directed to inquire and report . . . what legislation is
necessary to enable [federal courts] to enforce the freedom of the wives and children of
soldiers of the United States under the joint resolution of Congress of March 3 1865, and
also to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery.270

At this point, the resolution contemplated that the Judiciary
Committee recommend legislation securing the freedom of military
266. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (quoting the response to a congressman’s
concern about preserving judicial authority to discharge prisoners taken by the military
governments).
267. After asserting that various legislative point people misunderstood crucial parts of the
legislation that they were drafting, Professor Mayers acerbically observed that they figured out
what the legislation meant and expressed that understanding in floor debates two years later.
See Mayers, supra note 262, at 39, 39–40 n.39 (suggesting Trumbull was ignorant of the bill’s
purpose when he reported it and only understood two years later). Mayers does not convey the
political context of the subsequent floor debates. Everyone—Democrats and Republicans—had
switched positions because of the firefight over the bill repealing Supreme Court jurisdiction over
habeas decisions in lower courts. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 540, 542 (“The 1868
debates . . . presented the anomalous spectacle of Republicans depreciating the scope of their
1867 habeas corpus measure, while the Democrats argued for a liberal reading of the act.”). After
Ex parte Milligan, most lawmakers believed that the Supreme Court was poised to strike down
key pieces of Reconstruction. The Republicans were seeking to avert that result through the
repealer, and the Democrats were trying to secure it. As a result, the Democrats were giving
floor speeches making the repealed jurisdiction sound like the font of universal liberty, and the
Republicans were trying to make it sound like no big deal. See id. 540–42. The legislators had
not come to an authentic understanding of the 1867 Habeas Act; they were engaged in rank
political posturing.
268. J. Res. 29, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. (1865).
269. The Emancipation Proclamation, which freed slaves only in slave states that remained
in active rebellion, was an exercise of his Executive Authority to Command the Army and the
Navy. See Abraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation January 1, 1863, in LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 424 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
270. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865). Much of Mayers’ paper assumes that the
Resolution remained the controlling description of legislative purpose throughout the processing
of the bill. When subsequent remarks about the purpose or operation of the Act are inconsistent
with the joint resolution, Professor Mayers describes the speakers as “ignorant” of the purpose of
the Act; the comments were perfectly reasonable because the purpose of the Act had changed.
See, e.g., Mayers, supra note 262, at 38–39 (analyzing Senator Trumbull’s remarks).
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families pursuant to the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, and
the “liberty” of all persons pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
(The Secretary of State had certified the Thirteenth Amendment
the day before Shellabarger’s resolution.)271 On January 8, 1866,
Representative James Wilson, the Republican chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, introduced and referred to his committee a “bill
to secure the writ of Habeas Corpus to persons held in slavery or
involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution of the United
States.”272
If the legislative history ended there, then the narrowing
interpretation looks about right. But the Judiciary Committee—along
with the Select Committee on Elections, ground zero for
Reconstruction policy in the House273—dramatically expanded the
scope of the bill when Representative William Lawrence reported it
out of the committee on July 25, 1866.274 Lawrence was a conservative
Republican275 and one of the most respected legislators of the
Reconstruction era.276 Legal and historical scholarship favoring the
narrow interpretation of the 1867 Act inexplicably treats the later
version reported out of committee by Lawrence as an aberration while
treating the earlier version referred into committee by Wilson as
indicative of authentic statutory meaning.277 That scholarship has it
exactly backwards. The bill that the House Judiciary Committee
produced as output, rather than the one it took as input, is the
superior reference point for any interpretive exercise predicated on the
Act’s legislative history.
The bill that Representative Lawrence reported out, which
eventually became the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, had two sections. The
first provided that “the several justices and judges” of the federal
courts “shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of [federal law.]”278 So, section 1 of the 1867 Judiciary Act
extended federal habeas power to state custody. The second section—
271. Sec’y William H. Seward, U.S. Dep’t of State, Proclamation No. 52, 13 Stat. 774 (1865).
272. Wilson’s Bill was not printed in the Congressional Globe, but Professor Mayers
unearthed it at the National Archives. See Mayers, supra note 262, at 34, 34 n.16 (explaining the
original handwritten bill is in the National Archives).
273. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 96–97 (referring to the House Elections Committee as
one of the most conservative committees in Congress).
274. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150 (1866).
275. BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 28.
276. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 538 n.25 (describing Lawrence’s reputation).
277. See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 262 (applying limit from Wilson’s proposed Bill to text of
Lawrence’s); Mayers, supra note 262, at 37 (same).
278. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150 (1866).
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which some have mistakenly described as “unrelated”—expanded the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to include, speaking generally,
all determinations that state action did not violate the Constitution
and all determinations that federal law did.279 That expanded power
necessarily cemented Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas
dispositions in inferior federal courts. “Unrelated” it was not.
There are two important threads of legislative discussion that
preceded passage of the 1867 Habeas Act, one from the House and one
from the Senate. The House thread developed as Representative
Lawrence reported out the Judiciary Committee bill. It contains a
snippet of Lawrence’s floor speech, which entered the habeas canon by
way of Justice Brennan’s flawed-but-iconic opinion in Fay v. Noia.280
Lawrence conveyed that the House Judiciary Committee had proposed
an amendment to section 2 of the Act, which provided that the Act
would not apply to any prisoner who “is or may be held in the military
custody of the military authority of the United States, charged with
any military offense, or having aided or abetted [the rebellion prior to
the passage of the Act.]”281 Some of his House colleagues expressed
concern that the Act might deny the privilege to civilians taken into
custody by the military.282 The famous snippet came as a response to
Representative Francis Le Blond, an Ohio Democrat concerned with
preserving judicial authority to discharge prisoners taken into custody
by President Johnson’s military governments.283 The response seems a
non sequitur:
[T]he effect of [this bill] is to enlarge the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and make
the jurisdiction of courts and judges of the United States coextensive with all the powers
that can be conferred upon them. It is a bill of the largest liberty, and does not interfere
with persons in military custody, or restrain the writ of habeas corpus at all.284

Lawrence’s remark may have been a weak response to the
objection, but the weakness lies in the fit between question and
answer. The answer still expresses the thrust of the legislation: the
privilege was going to get a lot bigger, and consistent with the text of
the statute, it was going to reach all custody in violation of federal

279. See id. at 4150–51 (summarizing section 2 of the Act).
280. See 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
(referring to Rep. Lawrence’s description of the bill).
281. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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law.285 Despite the confusion over the meaning of the military-custody
exception,286 the bill passed the House.287
When the bill moved to the upper chamber, the confusion over
military detention spilled over to the Senate floor. That confusion
notwithstanding, no one seemed to doubt that the bill otherwise
extended the privilege to reach all unlawful custody.288 Senator
Trumbull reported the House bill out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on July 27, 1866.289 Trumbull dropped any reference to the
Joint Resolution that had marked the beginning of the process, and he
made the implications for state custody abundantly clear: “Now, a
person might be held under a State law in violation of [federal law],
and he ought to have . . . the benefit of the writ, and we agree that he
ought to have recourse to [federal courts.]”290 After the same
clarification regarding military custody that was necessary to move
the bill through the House, as well as an amendment providing that
judges from one judicial district could not issue habeas writs to
prisoners in others, the bill passed the Senate.291
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 became law on February 5.
Almost immediately, federal judges—including Chief Justice Salmon
P. Chase—began using it to thwart the South’s Black Codes.292 The
Fourteenth Amendment, not coincidentally designed in part to
285. Professor Mayers considers it significant that the statute referenced only “any person
restrained of his or her liberty,” and did not mention state “custody” or jail. Mayers, supra note
264, at 35 & n.18. Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which furnished the original statutory
habeas guarantee, had expressly referenced prisoners in jail. The selection of terminology,
Professor Mayers believes, shows that the original intent of the statute was to extend the
privilege only to freedmen and Southern loyalists. The terminological differences have much
better explanations than the ones Professor Mayers provided. First, the term “jail” was used in
the 1789 Judiciary Act—the term “gaol,” actually—to carve out an exception to an otherwise
global habeas guarantee. Eliminating the reference to the word “jail” was a way of eliminating
the exception, not extending it implicitly. Second, the statute does not mention state custody
because many of the Southern states were not yet restored. Most of the South was under military
control, not control of a state sovereign. Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution As
Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2044 (2003).
286. Advocates of the narrowing interpretation are fond of pointing out LeBlond’s floor
comment that “it is exceedingly difficult for us to determine the scope of the bill.” CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866). That comment was in reference to the military-custody issue,
not an expression of confusion over the fact that the grant of habeas power over state custody
was a general one.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 4228–29 (discussing ramifications of the bill in congressional debate).
289. Id. at 4228.
290. Id. at 4229.
291. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1867); see also id. at 903 (1867) (reporting that
the House agreed to the amendment).
292. Wiecek, supra note 250, at 541 (citing In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (D. Md. 1867)).
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neutralize the Codes, was certified by the Secretary of State on July
28, 1868.293 The habeas privilege, contemporaneously enforced by
federal judges and guaranteed in the PI Clause, entitled a state
prisoner to a federal habeas forum.294 The 1867 Habeas Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment were mutually reinforcing features of the
federal supremacy established through Reconstruction.295
5. Slaughter-House and “Protection”
If the PI Clause referred to anything other than a federal
forum, then the reference would have been news to the SlaughterHouse majority. Per Justice Miller, privileges of national citizenship—
such as the habeas guarantee—owe “their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”296
Some consider obvious Justice Miller’s allusion to a federal privilege to
contest federal custody,297 but I struggle to find such clarity. Earlier in
the opinion, Justice Miller actually references Chief Justice Chase’s
use of the federal habeas power to review state custody.298 Moreover,
Justice Miller twice emphasizes that the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship include the right to seek “protection” from the

293. 15 Stat. 706 (1868).
294. The idea that the set of “privileges” secured by the Fourteenth Amendment included a
right of access to federal courts is not limited to the habeas account I offer here. Professor
Pfander has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment created authority for Congress to extend
the privilege of a federal diversity forum to American citizens residing in the District of
Columbia and in federal territories. See Pfander, supra note 245, at 1968. (Such persons were not
clearly covered under the original diversity grant because they were not “citizens of a state.” Id.
at 1925–26.)
295. I want to clear one last objection. Congress did not pass the 1867 Act in anticipation
that it would have enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Section 5
provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.”) Congress already had all the power it needed to pass the Act under Article I, § 8
(power necessary and proper to enumerated authority) or § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
(power to enforce antislavery content). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have
Power . . . [to] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2
(“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). Congress passed
the 1867 Act because it was one of the two legislative strategies it was using to reconstruct the
South and to restore the rebellious states: statute and amendment. If the Fourteenth
Amendment had never been ratified, only then would a federal forum for state prisoners be a
matter of legislative grace.
296. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
297. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 35, at 1258 (citing CROSSKEY, supra note 136, at 1128–30)
(calling the narrow, federal-only application of constitutional habeas principles the
“conventional” reading of Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion).
298. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70.
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federal government,299 a characterization consistent with a Type 2
privilege for the reasons explained below.300 The better reading of
Slaughter-House would assume reference to the contemporaneous
scope of the habeas privilege—one with Type 2 features—absent some
clear indication to the contrary. That privilege is access to a federal
forum to contest any unlawful custody, whether under color of state or
federal law.
When Justice Miller twice indicated that privileges and
immunities of national citizenship entail the federal government’s
“protection,” he was saying something that probably resonated more
in 1873 than it does now.301 An American citizen enjoys roughly the
same relation to the sovereign as did an English subject at common
law. As long as the citizen-subject maintained allegiance to the
sovereign, there were privileges that corresponded to sovereign
duties.302 The habeas privilege corresponded to a sovereign duty of
“protection.”303 The Thirty-Ninth Congress operated with precisely
this relationship in mind, which in turn reflected popular
understanding of nineteenth-century political membership.304 And
when the Thirty-Ninth Congress talked about the “protection” of law
flowing from the habeas privilege, it was talking about a citizen’s
entitlement to federal protection from unlawful state activity.305
C. Postconviction Application
I now attempt the subtle task of separating two issues that are
almost always commingled to the detriment of anybody trying to
understand either one of them. Whether the Constitution guarantees
a federal habeas forum to contest certain forms of custody is a distinct
question from whether that guarantee includes a privilege to contest a
299. Id. at 79.
300. See infra notes 302–06 and accompanying text.
301. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
302. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Broomall)
(“Upon whatever square foot of the earth’s surface I owe allegiance to my country, there is owes
me protection . . . .”); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (“They are, by constitutional
right, entitled to these privileges and immunities, and may assert this right . . . whenever they
go within the limits of the [nation].”).
303. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1836–37, 1902
(2009); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (statement of Rep. John
Broomall) (connecting right to federal protection with habeas privilege).
304. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Wilson)
(discussing the meaning of civil rights and immunities).
305. See id. at 1263 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (explaining that federal protection
was necessary because, among other things, the habeas privilege could not be “safely intrusted to
the governments of the several States”).
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criminal conviction. The constitutional status of the state-prisoner
remedy is one that must be resolved before courts can reach other
pressing habeas questions.
If federal courts cannot resolve whether the Constitution
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, then those courts
avoid second-order questions about whether inmates may collaterally
challenge a state criminal conviction. And if there is no clear account
on which state inmates can obtain federal habeas review of their
convictions, then courts can avoid third-order questions about the
permissibility of certain restrictions on the habeas remedy in that
context.
The proposition that the PI Clause secures a federal habeas
forum for state prisoners therefore has enormous implications for
modern postconviction law. The PI Clause did not constitutionalize
every jot of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act. Given that the content of the
privilege is defined largely by the set of jailers subject to federal
habeas power, however, the PI Clause did constitutionalize the 1867
Act’s major feature: the extension of judicial power to custody
exercised under color of state law.306 Such habeas power entails
judicial authority to entertain the petition for the writ, send it to any
entity over which the United States may exercise personal
jurisdiction, and order the prisoner discharged if custody is
unlawful.307 The defining feature of habeas power at common law was
that it allocated to judges the authority to determine what it means
for custody to be “lawful.” Where a judge has habeas power over a
custodian, there is judicial authority to say whether the detention is
unlawful because the custodian is not authorized to detain the
prisoner or because the process underlying the custody order renders
it void.308
Because a state prisoner’s constitutionally mandated habeas
privilege corresponds to judicial power over state jailors, legislative
restrictions on basic features of that power are unconstitutional.309
The second half of Habeas Power shows that the judicial power
corresponding to a federal privilege for federal prisoners should be
immune from significant legislative restriction.310 The basic question I
want to answer in this Part is what happens when that proposition
combines with the proposition I have developed in this Article: that
306. See supra Part IV.B.4.
307. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 760–64.
308. Id. at 765. More precisely, the habeas power includes authority to declare detention
unauthorized because of defects in the process producing the custodial order.
309. Id. at 803–09.
310. Id. at 795–810.
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the federal privilege extends to state custody. The short answer is that
judicially developed restrictions on a state-prisoner privilege are
constitutional; legislative limits are not. Or, to state the conclusion
differently, certain legislative restrictions on habeas power
unconstitutionally burden the privilege.
In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed
AEDPA.311 AEDPA contained a raft of changes to the federal habeas
statute. Two are most important for my purposes. First, AEDPA
contained several new rules barring courts from considering the
merits of procedurally defective postconviction challenges. Second,
AEDPA modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), adding a precondition to federal
relief for claims decided on the merits in state court. For such claims,
a federal court cannot grant relief before determining that the state
decision was either legally or factually defective.312 Section 2254(d)(1)
contains the standard for legal defectiveness, and it is probably the
most controversial rule in all of habeas law: the state proceedings
must have “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”313
Congress enacted harsh procedural limitations on relief, and
§ 2254(d) seems to say that federal judges cannot make independent
interpretations about what process produces lawful custody. The most
basic question is whether AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas
relief are constitutional. The almost-unanimous judicial consensus is
that they are.314 So little dissent surfaces in part because of the gap
that I target here: the absence of a satisfying constitutional account of
a state-prisoner privilege. Were the Federal Constitution to require
that state prisoners have a federal forum to contest the lawfulness of
their custody, then courts would have to answer tough questions about
whether AEDPA unconstitutionally restricts the habeas power that
corresponds to the privilege.
Any sentence in a habeas opinion that contains the familiar
words “it is for the legislature to determine” is probably wrong, at
least in part. I express no position on the prudence of habeas
restrictions, but Habeas Power shows that the contours of those
restrictions are to be shaped by judges, not legislators.315 The precise
311. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244–67 (2012)).
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (legal defectiveness); id. § 2254(d)(2) (factual defectiveness).
313. Id. § 2254(d)(1).
314. See Steiker, supra note 4, at 863 (describing the theory as having been “abandoned” by
the Supreme Court).
315. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795–810.
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method for identifying “essential” features of habeas power is beyond
my ambition here, and I do not proceed systematically through Title
28 in order to assess the constitutionality of every habeas provision.
The lattice of modern, statutorily imposed procedural restrictions is
properly the subject of another article. Suffice it to say that if the
same restrictions were prudential, rather than statutory, then one
would be disputing their desirability more than their constitutionality.
I will, however, commit myself to one specific position: if one
accepts the view of habeas power detailed in Habeas Power, and
accepts that it extends to state jailors, then AEDPA’s centerpiece, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), is unconstitutional. Section 2254(d)(1) was in many
ways a statutory rule designed to mirror the judicial rule announced
in Teague v. Lane.316 The “Teague bar” prevented convicted inmates
from invoking most subsequent Supreme Court decisions to argue that
their custody was unlawful.317 Teague’s basic effect was similar to that
of § 2254(d)(1),318 but the fact that Teague was a judicially created rule
makes all the difference. The Supreme Court can limit basic features
of the habeas remedy; Congress cannot.319 Again, the basic habeas
power allowing a judge to decide whether custody is lawful includes
determining whether procedural errors preclude a finding of
lawfulness.320 Congress can exert virtually complete control over what
qualifies as lawful custody by changing substantive law, but it
cannot—absent suspension—cheat the system by tweaking the habeas
remedy. It cannot insulate criminal convictions by restricting federal
habeas review to “unreasonable” errors. Because § 2254(d) bars a
judge from discharging prisoners whose custody the judge might
correctly determine to be unlawful, it unconstitutionally restricts the
habeas privilege and the power to which it corresponds.
V. CONCLUSION
I offer a constitutional proof for the proposition that state
prisoners are entitled to a federal habeas forum. A survey of pertinent
habeas precedent and scholarship might lead one to (fairly)

316. See 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that habeas corpus cannot be used to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, unless such new rules will apply retroactively to all
prior defendants on collateral review).
317. See generally Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433 (1993)
(providing overview of pre-AEDPA role of Teague).
318. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
381, 414–21 (1996) (discussing Teague).
319. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795–810.
320. See supra note 308.
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characterize my conclusion as idiosyncratic, but oddities and errors
are different things. In fact, none of the subsidiary propositions
comprising my proof are all that remarkable: the original Constitution
guaranteed a habeas privilege, the privilege was yoked to national
citizenship by the PI Clause, and that privilege is available to state
prisoners.
My previous article explained what habeas power entails, and
this Article contends that the habeas power extends to state custody.
Combining those two ideas yields the general insight sketched in
Section IV.C: that constitutional problems arise when Congress
severely restricts the ability of federal courts to review habeas
petitions challenging state convictions. This sort of collateral review,
however, is the major modern form of federal habeas activity. For that
reason alone, broad-stroke decisions invalidating multiple pieces of
the modern postconviction regime are unlikely. As a practical matter,
change would have to be incremental. I have offered few answers on
this front, although I hope to have guided readers to the right two
questions: First, what are the best principles for identifying
unconstitutional statutory limits on habeas power? And second, and
more importantly, under those principles, which modern habeas
restrictions make the cut?

